

Victimization, Citizen Engagement, and Policing in Lahore

Ali Cheema (IDEAS and LUMS)

Zulfiqar Hameed (Police Service of Pakistan)

Jacob N. Shapiro (Princeton University)

Institute of Development and Economic Alternatives¹ (2017)



¹ We are extremely grateful to Ahsan Zia Farooqui, Sayaf Naseem, Ammar Khalid, Usaid Awan and Bisma Haseeb. We would like to acknowledge the support provided by Ahsan Tariq and Usman Ghaus on sampling. We would also like to thank Shehryar Nabi for editing support.

Contents


Chapter 1: Executive Summary	3
Chapter 2: The Facts about Criminal Victimization in Lahore	12
Chapter 3: Victim Engagement with the Criminal Justice System.....	24
Chapter 4: Citizen Perceptions of the Police.....	37
Chapter 5: Reform Insights for the City Police	50
Bibliography.....	59
Appendix 1: Sampling Methodology	62

Chapter 1: Executive Summary

1.1. The Context

Punjab has witnessed a burgeoning crime problem since the early 1990s (Figures 1.1 and 1.2). The Punjab Police's registered crime data shows that the challenge in the province has been particularly acute in the case of per capita crime against property (Figure 1.1). The province witnessed a doubling of per capita crime² against property between 1991 and 2015. The data also shows that the public safety challenge has been much more severe in Lahore, Punjab's capital city with an estimated population of 11.1 million³, compared to the provincial average (Figure 1.1). The evidence shows that per capita crime against property increased by more than 3 times in the capital city during the past quarter of a century, which is a much steeper rise than that witnessed in the rest of the province. While the rest of the province has witnessed a significant drop in the trend of crime against property during the past five years, the capital city continues to experience a positive trend, albeit one that is growing at a slower rate.

Figure 1.1: Crime against Property Trends in Punjab



Source: Punjab Police Crime Data, Punjab Development Statistics (various years) and Population Census (1998, 2017).

Note: Crimes against property include theft (including vehicles theft), burglary, robbery (including forcible snatching of vehicles)⁴, dacoity⁵, attempts at all these offences (e.g. attempted robbery etc.) and extortion⁶.


² Figures 1.1 and 1.2 report per capita crime figures to address the concern that rising crime is simply a consequence of population growth.

³ Population Census 2017 provisional report.

⁴ Section 390 of the Pakistan Penal Code defines robbery. It states that "Theft is 'robbery' if, in order to the committing of the theft, or in committing the theft, or in carrying away or attempting to carry away property obtained by the theft,

The registered crime data also shows two steep escalations in per capita crime against person, which hits a peak at the turn of the century and another one around 2011 (Figure 1.1). There has been a divergence in the trend of per capita crime against person between the capital city of Lahore and the province around the turn of the 21st century and again since 2011. While the rest of the province has seen a significant and sustained drop in crime against person during the past five years, the scale of the drop appears to have tapered off in the capital city. Taken together this evidence suggests that the capital city of Lahore is facing an acute public safety challenge that is particularly related to crime against property.

Figure 1.2: Crime against Person Trends in Punjab



Source: Punjab Police Crime Data, Punjab Development Statistics (various years). And Population Census (1998, 2017)

Note: Crimes against person include murder, assault, attempted murder, kidnapping for ransom, and attempts at all these offences.

the offence, for that end, voluntarily causes or attempts to cause to any person death or hurt, or wrongful restraint, or fear of instant death or of instant hurt or of instant wrongful restraint”.

⁵ Section 391 of the Pakistan Penal Code defines dacoity. It states that “when five or more persons conjointly commit or attempt to commit a robbery, or where the whole number of persons conjointly committing or attempting to commit a robbery and persons present and aiding such commission or attempt, amount to five or more, every person so committing, attempting or aiding is said to commit ‘dacoity’”.

⁶ Section 383 of the Pakistan Penal Code defines extortion. It states that “whoever intentionally puts any person in fear of any injury to that person, or to any other, and thereby dishonestly induces the person so put in fear to deliver to any person any property or valuable security or anything signed or sealed which may be converted into a valuable security, commits ‘extortion’”.

In a companion paper we show that crime in Punjab has emerged primarily as an urban problem that has become particularly severe in the capital city (Cheema, Naseer and Hameed 2017). This is an important finding because Punjab is undergoing a structural transformation with rising population densities (Ali 2013, Haque 2014) and rapidly growing mega-cities. Our findings suggest that this challenge is only likely to worsen unless we make an effort to understand the challenges of public safety and policing in developing country mega-cities and are able to devise innovative solutions to these problems. Recent literature argues that there is no avoiding the downsides of growing urbanization, which include contagious diseases, congestion and crime (Glaeser and Sims 2015). Therefore, it is essential to develop an understanding of the public safety challenges facing citizens in mega-cities.

1.2. The purpose of this report

The main objective of this report is to provide evidence about victimization and the costs associated with the criminal justice system that are borne by citizens of Lahore. We also review secondary evidence on the effectiveness of the criminal justice system.⁷ This analysis is important because the Government of Punjab is in the process of scaling-up a number of ambitious measures to increase the efficiency of the system and reduce its costs for victims of crime that include: the computerized complaint handling system, the automated police station record management system, the automated beat book management system, an integrated call-for-service system,⁸ a smart phone-based crime mapping app and citizen feedback mechanisms.⁹

The current report presents rigorous and original evidence on the incidence and pattern of victimization and public safety, the costs associated with victimization, the place-based correlates of victimization and the challenges and costs of mediating the criminal justice system for victims. The report compares the victimization rate in Lahore with rates in other global cities for which similar data is available.

It is the first report to undertake an analysis of place-based correlates of victimization in Pakistan. We focus on the role of place as the recent literature in criminology suggests that place is a fundamental context that has widespread effects on crime and citizen perceptions of public safety (Sampson 2013, Sampson and Stephen 1999). We also provide evidence on how this context is impacting citizen trust in the police, its legitimacy as an institution and the willingness of the citizenry to cooperate with it.

The report analyzes the issue of public safety by examining the everyday lives of citizens. As a result, it emphasizes types of victimization confronted by citizens in their daily lives and under-emphasizes issues of terrorism and violent threats to security. It is important to point out that a comprehensive public safety strategy needs to address both sets of issues. While there is a growing corpus of work on terrorism and extremism, there is little research on the public safety challenges that affect the everyday life of citizens. This report attempts to fill this gap.

While providing a comprehensive and actionable reform plan is beyond the scope of this report, it responds to the evidence by highlighting innovative approaches to public safety that move beyond the status-quo and need to be adopted as an integral part of any reform package that is designed to address the challenges identified by data. We also highlight some immediate measures that are needed to build citizen trust in the

⁷ This analysis is based on Siddique (2016).

⁸ The integrated call for service has been institutionalized by the Punjab Safe Cities Authority as part of their integrated command, control and communication center (IC3).

⁹ For a review of these interventions see MIT Technology Review Pakistan (2017).

police and augment police legitimacy. We hope that this evidence will contribute towards building capacity for professional, sustainable and locally supported citizen-centric public safety in a developing mega-city context.

1.3. Methodology


The report is based on primary data collected between October 2016 and January 2017 through a crime and victimization survey that was designed and managed by the Institute of Development and Economic Alternatives (IDEAS). While the survey drew on international standard crime and victimization surveys and surveys of citizen perceptions of the police, it modified questions to Lahore's context after extensive field testing.¹⁰

We use a two-stage sampling methodology because an important purpose of the report is to analyze the effect of place on victimization (for details see appendix 1). The first-stage draws a random stratified sample of localities categorized by intensity of registered crime (Map 1) and the second-stage draws a random sample of respondents in each sample locality.¹¹ In the absence of a standardized definition of neighborhoods in Pakistani cities, we derive our primary sampling unit by superimposing an arbitrary geographic grid on the map of Lahore. The grid was calibrated to divide the city into squares with an area of 2500 m square. The decision about the size of the grid area was reached after extensive consultation with the Punjab Police who felt that this was an efficient size for patrolling purposes. Therefore, the primary sampling units used in this study are grid squares. For this report we call these squares "localities". We obtain representative estimates of variables at the Lahore level by weighting the sample using inverse probability weights. Our final sample totals 720 localities or grids and 5040 respondents.

¹⁰ The IDEAS crime and victimization survey drew on the following surveys on crime victimization and citizen perceptions: National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS), United States Bureau of Justice Statistics, JPAL public opinion survey, JPAL Indian Crime Survey, British Crime Survey, Kansas City Patrol (citizen) Survey (1972), Jackson et al. (2012), Jackson et al. (2014).

¹¹ We don't draw any sample from the police stations falling in the Lahore Cantonment area as we were not given permission to survey there because of security concerns.

Map 1. Sample Localities



1.4. What do the facts tell us?

We find that the citizens of Lahore fare much better in terms of criminal victimization than other global cities for which comparable data is available. Lahore also does much better than these cities in terms of citizens' perception of public safety.

Chapter 2 of this report finds that crime in Lahore tends to concentrate and cluster around commercial centers. This results in a more acute victimization challenge in localities with high commercial densities. It finds that the perceptions of public safety are worse in commercial centers compared to other localities. It also finds that criminal activity in commercial areas tends to be mobile and criminals have the ability to move around quickly within and across multiple jurisdictions. These findings have not been acknowledged in the policy or academic discussion on public safety in the city and have important implications for crime control strategies. The chapter also finds that property-related victimization dominates the composition of criminal victimization and this imposes a heavy economic loss on citizens. **An important challenge for policing in Lahore is to ensure public safety, particularly security from robbery and theft in the city's commercial centers.**

Chapter 3 finds that the city's criminal justice system is not acting as an effective mechanism of deterrence as the ability of the system to penalize perpetrators is low because of high acquittal rates. Siddique (2016) attributes high acquittal rates to weak investigation and prosecution capacity. An important reason for the lack of effectiveness of the criminal justice system is the anonymity challenge related to the urban context. Chapter 3 finds that only 19% of victims in our data were able to provide any relevant information about their perpetrator. We also find that lack of information about perpetrators with victims has an adverse effect on arrest rates. **The second challenge for public safety policy is to devise innovative strategies that can**

improve deterrence outcomes in an urban context where information about offenders is sparse (what we refer to as the urban anonymity challenge) and judicial deterrence is weak.

How effective is the criminal justice system in servicing the needs of citizens who have suffered from victimization? Chapter 3 finds that there is great demand for the services of the state-run criminal justice system among citizens and reliance on non-state forums is extremely low.¹² The good news is that a large proportion of our respondents report that their complaints were recorded by the police¹³ and this may be a consequence of the recently introduced automated police station record management system. However, Chapter 3 shows that this gain for citizens is being offset by an extremely low registration rate of first information reports (FIRs)¹⁴, which is much lower than the rate in other global contexts.¹⁵ What is worrying is that approximately one-fifth of respondents who reported an incident to the police said that they did not know what the outcome of their complaint was. This suggests that the process results in poor information flows between citizens and the police, which can cause considerable uncertainty and frustration among the users of the criminal justice system.

Our respondents' experience suggests that low registration rates are a consequence of incentives in the current policing system to under-report crime at the time of registration, the complexity and ad-hoc nature of the process and the general unwillingness in the city police to register cases (Chapter 3).¹⁶ We also find that the costs associated with the registration process are high for a significant proportion of the citizenry who have suffered victimization and are attempting to register a case. In this regard, we find that the direct experience of being confronted with a demand for unofficial payments doubles if a citizen becomes a complainant or a victim of crime whose complaint is recorded by the police.¹⁷ Chapter 3 also finds that in the case of complainants the high burden of unofficial payments is related to registration. **The third challenge is to reform the registration process in order to lower the cost of accessing the criminal justice system for victims of crime. As registration is embedded in the police station this will require structural reforms of the police station as an institution.**

¹² This finding echoes the evidence presented by Siddique (2013).

¹³ We find that 70% of victimization incidents reported to the police are recorded as complaints.

¹⁴ The process from reporting to registration entails two steps: having a complaint or incident recorded by the police and the registration of an First information report (FIR). An FIR is a written document prepared by the police, pursuant to the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code and Police Rules 1934, after they receive information about the commission of a cognizable offense. It is an important document because it sets the process of criminal justice in motion and it is only after an FIR is registered that the police take up investigation. An FIR is different from complaints or incident reporting. Complaints or incident reporting implies communicating an allegation that is made orally or in writing, and is meant to be recorded in the daily diary of the Police. Complaints may or may not be converted into an FIR.

¹⁵ Based on our survey data and the police's administrative data we find that 6.4% of victimizations are registered in Lahore as FIRs, which compares to 6% registered as FIRs in Delhi, 19% registered as criminal incidents in urban US and 42% registered as criminal incidents in London.

¹⁶ These findings survive even if we restrict our sample to cognizable cases only. Cognizable cases are those offences (as defined by the law) in which the police can directly register a case and start an investigation. There is a large category of offences, mostly minor in nature, where the police cannot register a case and start an investigation without a court's direction. This distinction, not known to most citizens, is a source of considerable frustration among the citizens, even though it is legally mandated.

¹⁷ We find that more than 50% of complainants (victims whose complaint was recorded by the police during the past 12 months and an FIR may or may not have been registered) report having had direct experience with unofficial payments. We also find that this percentage more than halves for non-complainants (respondents who did not suffer any victimization during this period or where victims who either didn't report their complaint or whose complaint didn't get recorded).

Chapter 4 analyses how citizens' perception about police effectiveness; procedural fairness associated with the criminal justice system; and legitimacy, honesty and trustworthiness of the city police service are being shaped in this context. It finds that while a majority of citizens consider the police effective, a minority thinks it is trustworthy and procedurally fair and an even smaller minority thinks it is honest. Citizens also have a strong perception that the police and its procedures are biased in favor of the wealthy and the connected. Chapter 4 shows that these perceptions are worse among citizens who have suffered victimization and end up being the main users of the criminal justice system. This suggests that the relationship between victims and the police is broken and needs to be fixed on an urgent basis.

The silver lining is that in spite of these poor perceptions, the willingness of the community to cooperate with the police is high (Chapter 4). Our interpretation of this finding is that citizens are willing to cooperate because of the lack of availability of robust non-state forums, which creates a comparative advantage for the state system. The willingness of the citizens to cooperate, however, gives reformers of the police system something to build on.

Chapter 4 also finds that the strongest predictors of citizen trust in the police are perceptions of honesty and police effectiveness. Procedural fairness is a weak predictor of trust. **This suggests that the automated police station record management system and citizen complaint and feedback interventions on their own may not have a large impact on trust in the police unless they are designed to lower the burden of unofficial payments and increase the effectiveness of the police in combating crime. It is, therefore, important that the Government of Punjab rigorously evaluates the impact of these interventions on the incidence of unofficial payments and on deterrence outcomes.**

1.5. Insights for future reform

While providing a comprehensive and actionable set of reforms is beyond the scope of the report, Chapter 5 ends by outlining innovative approaches to crime control that directly address the deterrence challenge in a mega-city context. We also highlight some immediate measures that are needed to build citizen trust in the police and augment police legitimacy. Chapter 5 uses survey data to analyze how the interventions outlined below sit with the public. The analysis shows that the proposed interventions resonate well with our respondents and have the potential to create a favorable outcome for the police and government. These interventions include:

Smart prevention and unleashing the potential of the IC3 technology in Lahore

We argue that the police needs to innovate and move beyond the traditional model of reactive policing and build the capacity for proactive, preventive patrolling in Lahore that seeks to alter the cost and benefit of criminal activity in neighborhoods with high commercial density. The center piece of this innovative approach is saturated patrol and hotspot policing. The criminology literature suggests that the “effectiveness of the hot-spots policing approach has strong empirical support.” (Weisburd and Eck 2004). Saturated patrolling and hot-spot policing in the city should target local areas with high commercial density. Introducing this intervention in the city makes sense as crime has a tendency to concentrate in localities with high commercial density and mobile criminals. It also makes sense because the challenge of urban anonymity (sparse information about offenders) appears to lower the effectiveness of investigation and prosecution outcomes.

In our view, it is essential for the city police to move towards prevention that is forward-looking, analytical and smart with the capacity to respond swiftly and alter the cost and benefit for criminals who are mobile. This intervention should leverage the impressive public investment made by the Government of Punjab in Punjab Police Integrated Command, Control and Communication Center (PPIC3) Lahore, a global standard technological capability that integrates calls for service, real time surveillance using CCTVs and mobile cameras and rapid response units tied to a dispatch center. This has enhanced Lahore Police's capacity for smart preventive patrolling and policing. However, unleashing the true potential of PPIC3 will require complementary interventions. Without them, PPIC3 will simply be acting as a supplier of information to an unreformed institutional system that is struggling to cope with the demands of policing in a rapidly evolving urban context.

These complementary interventions include institutionalizing an automatic registration system for FIRs at the PPIC3 level in cases of crime against property where no one is nominated as an alleged culprit. This will reduce the transaction costs associated with registration for a large proportion of victims, enable rapid mobilization of resources and a swift response time from the police. This solution also addresses conventional concerns that automatic registration will lower the cost of frivolous cases and lead to an abuse of process. Creating a rapid, responsive service will require integrating adequate patrolling resources into the PPIC3 system.

There is a need to formulate and institutionalize a policy of "graded response". The policy should provide a framework for assigning calls to emergency response (which must be attended immediately), incidents where a delayed response in person is appropriate and incidents that only require a response by phone. There is also a need to institutionalize a proactive advisory helpline that helps victims mediate the criminal justice process, gives advice about the most appropriate course of action available to them and connects them to available legal resources when necessary.

There is a need to devise a performance monitoring and reward system for patrol officers that sets clear objectives for patrol and for monitoring their achievement. Setting clear objectives will require identifying measurable objectives that are tightly defined, placing them in the context of the area's crime and incident patterns, specifying the location and time when problems occur and defining the scale of the problem.

There is also a need to build capacity for proactive patrolling by encouraging a problem-solving approach and enabling geographic policing at the neighborhood level. The key is to build the capacity for smart analysis that can identify and predict criminogenic areas so that police deployment can stay ahead of criminals. It will also involve creating a command-driven deployment protocol that is evidence and analysis-based rather than responding solely to the gut feeling of the patrol officers.

Some of these measures have already been introduced by the Punjab Information Technology Board (PITB) and the Punjab Police. What is required is their effective institutionalization and implementation at scale. However, it is important to recognize that the effects of these measures will be attenuated in the absence of reforms of the registration process and the incentive system at the level of the police station, and the integration of the PPIC3 with a reformed institutional structure of field policing.

Community policing in criminogenic localities

We argue that it will be difficult for the police to undertake smart and targeted prevention at scale without working closely with the communities that inhabit criminogenic localities. In our view, community policing

needs to be brought to center stage as a measure to achieve deterrence and build trust between citizens and the police. The key is to tie the outputs of surveillance and information to a community informed response system that is targeted to criminogenic areas. For this purpose we recommend that the Government of Punjab set up a matching grant system to incentivize coordinated responses between the police and the community.

Police station reforms to build trust in and legitimacy of the police

The evidence presented in this chapter suggests that an unreformed police station is imposing excessive costs on complainants and may also be an important factor underpinning weak deterrence. To start with institutionalizing a citizen responsive process of FIR registration will require structural reforms of the police station as an institution. This is because under the current system, the registration and investigation processes are embedded in police stations. Feedback from our respondents highlights the distortions that are resulting from poor incentives to register crime and process cases in a timely fashion as well as the complexity and ad-hoc nature of these processes. Feedback from the police highlights the distortions that are resulting from the lack of adequate budgets for investigation and human capital challenges. A comprehensive reform of the police station as an institution will require enhanced fiscal support, investment in building human capital, restructuring the performance incentives of station house officers (SHO) and institutionalizing standardized processes that incorporate citizen feedback, are tied to the performance-based accountability of officers and are transparent. This large-scale reform is unlikely to happen in the short-run because of political economy challenges and because it will require further diagnostic work – on adequacy of budgets, distortions in performance incentives and the nature of human capital challenges – to build a consensus on how to best address these challenges.

Chapter 2: The Facts about Criminal Victimization in Lahore

This chapter reviews the facts about victimization and perceptions of public safety in the mega-city of Lahore, which is home to 11.1 million people. We contextualize our findings by comparing victimization rates and perceptions of public safety in Lahore to the rates found in other global cities for which we have comparable data. We also provide an overview of the composition of victimization incidents and their costs. This is followed by an analysis of the types of places that are prone to criminal victimization. We focus on the role of place as the recent literature in criminology suggests that “place – especially as manifested in neighborhoods – is a fundamental context that has widespread effects on crime, perceptions of order or disorder...including the social organization of the contemporary metropolis” (Sampson 2013). If “place” or “localities”¹⁸ really matter as the literature suggests then this has tremendous implications for policing strategies and requires a rethinking of status quo approaches. This chapter uses evidence to address two important questions: do attributes of localities matter for criminal victimization? If so, what types of localities are attractors of crime in Lahore? This analysis has direct implications for public policy and strategies related to public safety.

Our main findings are¹⁹:

- The citizens of Lahore fare much better in terms of criminal victimization than other global cities for which comparable data is available.
- Lahore also does much better than these cities in terms of citizens’ perception of public safety.
- We find a strong correlation in Lahore between local commercial density and total and property-related victimization. This suggests that the chances of a citizen being victimized rise with the commercial density of a locality. This correlation holds up in perceptions of public safety as well. This is a pattern that has not found acknowledgement in the policy discussion on public safety and has important implications for crime control strategies. Discussions with police and victims indicate that offenders conducting crime in commercial areas tend to be mobile and have the ability to move around quickly within and across multiple police jurisdictions. As offenders targeting commercial areas have the ability to move around quickly, effective deterrence would require the police to build the capacity for swift response to deter criminals.
- We also find that property-related victimization²⁰ dominates the composition of criminal victimization. Therefore, an important challenge for policing in Lahore is to ensure public safety, in particular security from robbery and theft, in the city’s commercial centers as our findings suggest that property-related victimization imposes a heavy economic loss on the average citizen.

¹⁸ As mentioned in Chapter 1 our primary unit of sampling and analysis is geographic grids that we construct by dividing the whole of Lahore into 500 x 500 m grids. We use this unit as there is no standardized definition of neighborhoods in Lahore and because our consultation with the police department suggested that the 500 x 500 m area size is functional for the purposes of patrol. For the purposes of the report we refer to these primary units as grids or localities.


¹⁹ In order to ensure that our results are representative of Lahore we weight our results using inverse probability weights. For details see Appendix 1.

²⁰ Property-related victimization includes theft, burglary, robbery, dacoity, extortion and attempts at all these offenses.

2.1. Criminal victimization in Lahore: Global comparisons

Figure 2.1 shows that Lahore has a lower victimization rate than a sample of global cities from India, urban US and England. The victimization rate in Lahore is around 25 percent less than the rate found in Mumbai, London and the average for US' urban areas and it is 15 percent less than the rate found in Delhi.


Figure 2.1: Lahore's Victimization Rate in Global Comparison



Source: (1) IDEAS Lahore Crime Victimization Survey, 2016; (2) Crime Victimization and Safety Perception: A Public Survey of Delhi and Mumbai, Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, 2015; (3) NCVS Victimization Analysis Tool, (<http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=nvat>), Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2014 ; (4) Crime in England and Wales: Bulletin Tables, Office of National Statistics, UK, 2016.

Figures 2.2 and 2.3 show that Lahore is doing much better than other global cities for which we have data about person and property victimization. Figure 2.2 shows that Lahore has a much lower person victimization rate than other global cities. Lahore's person victimization rate is 40 percent lower than the rates found in Mumbai, Delhi and London. This suggests that it is, indeed, a safe city by global standards in terms of violent crime targeted towards person.

Figure 2.2: Lahore’s Person Victimization Rate in Global Comparison




Source: (1) IDEAS Lahore Crime Victimization Survey, 2016; (2) Crime Victimization and Safety Perception: A Public Survey of Delhi and Mumbai, Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, 2015; (3) NCVS Victimization Analysis Tool, (<http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=nvat>), Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2014 ; (4) Crime in England and Wales: Bulletin Tables, Office of National Statistics, UK, 2016.

Note: Crimes against person include murder, assault, attempted murder and kidnapping for ransom and include attempts at all these offences.

However, the differences in property victimization rates between Lahore and other global cities is not as large as the differences found in person victimization rates (Figure 2.3). In fact, property victimization rates in Lahore are only marginally lower than the rates found in Delhi, although they are much lower compared to U.S. cities and London. Property crime appears to be an important victimization challenge facing the citizens of Lahore and controlling it must be a top priority of government.

Figure 2.3: Lahore’s Property Victimization Rate in Global Comparison




Source: (1) IDEAS Lahore Crime Victimization Survey, 2016; (2) Crime Victimization and Safety Perception: A Public Survey of Delhi and Mumbai, Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, 2015; (3) NCVS Victimization Analysis Tool, (<http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=nvat>), Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2014 ; (4) Crime in England and Wales: Bulletin Tables, Office of National Statistics, UK, 2016.

Note: Crimes against property include theft (including vehicles theft), burglary, robbery (including forcible snatching of vehicles), dacoity, extortion and attempts at all these offences (e.g. attempted robbery etc.).

2.2. Citizen perceptions of public safety in Lahore: Global comparisons

How does Lahore fare in terms of global comparisons of citizens’ perceptions of safety? Only four percent of the respondents of the IDEAS Lahore CVS report their locality as unsafe, which is far lower than the percentage reporting their neighborhood as unsafe in Delhi and Mumbai (Figure 2.4). This shows that the difference in the perception of local safety between Lahore and the above Indian cities corresponds closely to the differences in overall victimization. It reinforces our earlier finding that Lahore appears to be a safe city in terms of global comparisons.

Figure 2.4: Lahore Citizen’s Perception of Safety in Global Comparison




Source: (1) IDEAS Lahore Crime Victimization Survey 2016-17 and (2) Crime Victimization and Safety Perception: A Public Survey of Delhi and Mumbai, Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, 2015.

Note: The Lahore Crime Victimization Survey (2016) asks the following question: “In general how safe would you say your neighborhood is ...”, with responses varying over a six-point Likert scale where: 1=very safe (there is never a crime in this area), 2=moderately safe (there is a crime in this area once a year), 3=slightly safe (there is a crime in this area once in 6 months), 4=slightly dangerous (there is a crime in this area once in 3 months), 5=moderately dangerous (there is a crime in this area once a month), 6=very dangerous (there is a crime in this area once a week). The Crime Victimization and Safety Perception survey in Mumbai and Delhi (2015) asks the following question; “How safe is the neighborhood?” Responses varied across the following five-point Likert scale: Very safe, Safe, Moderate, Unsafe, Very unsafe. This table uses these datasets to create an “unsafe variable” that equals 1 if a response to the question on safety is 5 or 6 in the IDEAS survey and if the response is unsafe or very unsafe in the Delhi-Mumbai survey.

2.3. Cost and composition of victimization incidents

Figure 2.5 shows that approximately 90% of victimization incidents in Lahore that correspond to cognizable offences relate to property crime. The composition of victimization is dominated by theft, robbery and car and vehicle snatching. Loss of property appears to present an extremely important challenge for citizens of Lahore and therefore it is important to have a sense of the economic loss associated with property victimization.

Figure 2.5: Composition of Victimization Incidents




Source: IDEAS Lahore Crime Victimization Survey, 2016.

Note: (1) Other cases include fraud, illegal possession, false cases etc. (2) This figure plots the distribution of victimization that corresponds to cognizable offenses.

Figure 2.6 reports the data on the magnitude of economic loss associated with property victimization. The IDEAS Lahore CVS asks respondents to report the value of property stolen or destroyed from a victimization incident. We estimate the economic loss of property victimization by adding up the value of property stolen or destroyed as a result of the incident. We derive a “magnitude of economic loss” measure that reports economic loss as a percentage of the monthly earnings of a victim. We use this measure to give a sense of the magnitude of loss suffered by a victim. Figure 2.6 reports the percentage of victims with magnitudes of economic loss in different ranges.

Figure 2.6: Economic Loss Suffered from Victimization



Source: IDEAS Lahore Crime Victimization Survey, 2016.

Note: To measure the value of property lost from victimization the survey asked respondents the following question; “In case any of your property was taken away during the crime, what was its value?”

Figure 2.6 shows that almost 50% of the victims in our data face a magnitude of economic loss that is equal to or greater than 60% of their monthly earnings. More than one-third of victims suffer a magnitude of economic loss that is greater than their monthly earnings.²¹ This shows that the losses associated with incidents of property crime in Lahore are non-trivial and involve significant costs for those who suffer from these incidents.²² This also suggests that significant economic costs are associated with property victimization and robust public policy measures are needed to address this challenge. The silver lining is that the scale of the public safety challenge in Lahore is at manageable levels in global terms and this means that efficient and smart policies and strategies have the potential to have a real economic impact on citizen’s lives.

²¹ Median earnings in our sample are Rs. 30,000 (USD 300) per month.

²² Crimes involving a magnitude of economic loss that is greater than monthly earnings include car and motorcycle theft and snatching, robbery and theft.


2.4. Does place matter for criminal victimization and citizen perception of safety?

The main purpose of this section is to analyze where criminal victimization tends to occur in Lahore. Does the evidence reveal systematic patterns that suggest a correlation between identifiable attributes of localities and the incidence of victimization? If so, “place” or “locality” attributes will provide an important explanation for the prevalence of victimization. This has important implications for both strategy and policy. To start, it would be important to focus resources on “places” or “localities” with attributes that attract criminal activity. Despite the recent emphasis on the importance of place in criminology and policing strategies (Brantingham and Brantingham 1984, Weisburd et al 2004, Weisburd et al 2012), there is a paucity of evidence on this issue in the Pakistani context and this is one of the first reports that produces original evidence on this issue. Analyzing place-based attributes of crime is also important as our data doesn’t find that the chances of victimization are directly related to socio-economic characteristics of survey respondents.

As explained in the last chapter, the IDEAS Lahore CVS followed a two-stage sampling strategy. The first stage drew a sample of 720 geographic grids (or “localities”) in Lahore and the second-stage drew a random sample of seven households from each grid (or “locality”). This sampling strategy allows us to conduct analysis at the grid (“locality”) and the respondent levels. This section focuses on grid or locality-level analysis as our interest is in the association between place and criminal victimization. Since our sample isn’t a random sample of Lahore’s 4600 grids, we ensure it is representative by weighing our data using the inverse probability weighting method where we calculate weights by multiplying the inverse of the probability that a grid is selected with the grid’s share of population.

We begin by asking whether victimization is concentrated in certain places or quite diffuse. Figure 2.7 plots the cumulative percentage of victimization against the cumulative percentage of localities or grids. This allows us to estimate the degree of concentration of victimization incidents across localities or grids. **It shows that nearly 40% of reported incidents (y-axis) occur in only 10% of localities or grids (x-axis). Similarly, we find that 60% of reported incidents occur in only 20% of localities or grids. We also find that slightly less than 30% of localities account for more than 75% of reported incidents in our data. As opposed to this, respondents in 40% of localities don’t report any incidents of victimization at all. These findings suggest that victimization appears to be quite concentrated.**

Figure 2.7: Locality level Concentration of Victimization



Source: IDEAS Lahore Crime Victimization Survey, 2016.

Note: Crime incidents and their locations have been identified through a crime screener in the survey and aggregated at the grid or locality level to analyze the spatial concentration of victimization in Lahore.


What are the key attributes that differentiate localities that attract criminal victimization from other localities? The main pattern that we see in our data is the strong positive correlation between local commercial density and the victimization rate (Figure 2.8). This correlation persists even if we control for other locality level characteristics that include per capita income, unemployment rate, immigrants, population density of localities, percentage of respondents in a locality who have completed high, middle and primary school, percentage of respondents in a locality who own their house and locality level income inequality.

In order to keep the analysis tractable we categorize the degree of commercial density at the locality level into three categories: commercial, mixed and residential. We classify localities as “commercial” if a majority of our seven randomly drawn respondents in a locality are engaged in commercial activity. We classify localities as “residential” if a majority of our random sample in a locality consists of residential households. The remaining category is called mixed. Locality-level victimization rates are calculated as the percentage of respondents in a locality who report at least one victimization incident.

Figure 2.8 reports victimization rates by type of locality. We find that victimization rates increase with local commercial density. The victimization rate in mixed localities is 5% higher than the rate found in residential

localities. The difference with residential rates increases to 10% in the case of commercial localities. This is strong evidence of a positive correlation between local commercial density and the victimization rate.

Figure 2.8: Local Commercial Density and Victimization Rates




Source: IDEAS Lahore Crime Victimization Survey, 2016.

Notes: (1) The error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. The error bars show that 95% confidence intervals for different locality types do not overlap and hence victimization rate in mix and commercial localities is statistically different from that of residential locality type; (2) Localities that have 5-7 commercial respondents in a neighborhood out of a total of 7 are classified as “commercial”; localities with 3-4 commercial respondents are classified as “mixed”; and those with less than 3 commercial respondents are classified as “residential”.

We find an equally strong correlation between property crime and commercial density of localities (Figure 2.9).²³ Discussions with police and victims indicate that offenders conducting crime in commercial areas tend to be mobile and have the ability to move around quickly within and across multiple jurisdictions.

²³ We don't find a strong correlation between local commercial density and crimes against person and we hence don't report this graph.

Figure 2.9: Local Commercial Density and Property Victimization Rates




Source: IDEAS Lahore Crime Victimization Survey, 2016.

Notes: (1) The error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. The error bars show that 95% confidence intervals for different locality types do not overlap and hence victimization rate in mix and commercial localities is statistically different from that of residential locality type; (2) Localities that have 5-7 commercial respondents in a neighborhood out of a total of 7 are classified as “commercial”; localities with 3-4 commercial respondents are classified as “mixed”; and those with less than 3 commercial respondents are classified as “residential”.

Our survey also recorded citizens’ perception about whether things have become much better in their locality with regard to violent and property crime during the last year as compared to the previous year. Figure 2.10 plots this information for the three types of localities. Overall we find that a majority of our survey respondents (over 80%) report that things have become much better with regard to both violent and property crime in their localities²⁴. This suggests that interventions introduced by the Government of Punjab may indeed be having a positive impact. However, there are big differences in terms of locality type, with 15% fewer respondents from mixed and commercial localities saying that things have become much better in the case of property crime as compared to respondents from residential localities. This reinforces our earlier finding that lack of safety is a correlate of local commercial density.

²⁴ This corresponds to the recent slowdown observed in the Lahore police’s registered crime data (see Figure 1.1 and 1.2). Understanding the causes of this slowdown is an important area of future research.

Figure 2.10: Local Commercial Density and Citizen Perception of Improvement in Safety



Source: IDEAS Lahore Crime Victimization Survey, 2016.

Notes: (1) The error bars represent 95% confidence intervals; (2) The IDEAS Lahore CVS asked respondents the following questions: (a) “Think now about violent crime in this area – meaning attacks on people like shootings, stabbings, and rapes. Would you say that during the past year things have been getting better or worse as compared to the previous year?” and (b) “Think now about property crime in this area, I mean crimes involving property like burglary, auto theft, and vandalism. Would you say that during the past year things have been getting better or worse as compared to the previous year?” Respondents were asked to give responses using a scale of 1-5, where 1=much better, 3=the same and 5=much worse.

2.5. Conclusion

The analysis in this chapter has important implications for public policy and strategy around public safety in Lahore. Securing commercial localities has to be an important objective of public safety policy in the city. The challenge for policy and strategy is to give protection against property crime in areas of the city which are public and where large numbers of people agglomerate. Providing effective security and protection from economic loss will, therefore, require a radical rethink of patrolling strategies and tactics as well as the manner in which the police engages with local residents. It will require making central the spatial dimension of citizen safety especially in the allocation of patrolling resources and designing institutional mechanisms to work with commercial communities to secure the city’s commercial areas. As offenders targeting commercial areas have the ability to move around quickly, effective deterrence would require that the police build effective capacity for swift response to deter criminals.

Chapter 3: Victim Engagement with the Criminal Justice System

This chapter provides evidence on the nature of citizen engagement with the criminal justice system with an emphasis on the challenges and costs. The aim is to analyze ongoing systemic challenges to inform the conversation on reform being had by policymakers and parliamentarians. This analysis is important because the Government of Punjab has introduced and is in the process of scaling-up ambitious measures to increase the efficiency of the system and reduce its costs for victims of crime that include: the computerized complaint handling system, the automated police station record management system, the automated beat book management system, an integrated call-for-service system,²⁵ a smart phone-based crime mapping app and citizen feedback mechanisms²⁶. It is thus important to take stock of the outcomes of the criminal justice system at this juncture. The chapter documents challenges faced by respondents who have suffered victimization during the last year as they are the main users of the criminal justice system. We focus on the challenges experienced by victims in terms of reporting crimes, having complaints recorded and registration of first information reports (FIRs) by the police. We also review evidence on the effectiveness of the criminal justice system in terms of outcomes. Our main findings are given below.²⁷

Challenges related to reporting and registration²⁸:

- The state's criminal justice system is the main mechanism used by citizens to deal with crime and disorder issues in Lahore. Around 44% of respondents who suffered an incident of victimization during the last year say they contacted the police to report the incident. This suggests that there is a healthy demand for services offered by the state-run criminal justice system among the citizenry. We find no differences in the tendency to report between low income²⁹ and other respondents as well as between commercial and residential respondents.
- We also find that a large (70%) percentage of victimization incidents reported to the police are recorded as complaints. This could be a result of the recently introduced automated police station record management system.
- However, this gain for citizens is being offset by an extremely low rate of registration of first information reports (FIRs). We find that only 7% of victimization incidents reported by citizens in our survey are registered as FIRs by the police in Lahore. The FIR registration rate³⁰ in Lahore is much smaller than the rate of crime registration³¹ found in the urban U.S. (19%) and in London

²⁵ The integrated call for service has been institutionalized by the Punjab Safe Cities Authority as part of their integrated command, control and communication center (PPIC3).

²⁶ For a review of recently introduced interventions see MIT Technology Review Pakistan (2017).

²⁷ The figures and tables used in this chapter present representative estimates at the Lahore level by weighting our sample using inverse probability weights. For details, see Appendix 1.

²⁸ In this chapter we restrict our results to cognizable offences which are crimes for which police officers have the authority to register a case and start an investigation with or without the permission of a court and make an arrest without a warrant on finding sufficient evidence of guilt of a perpetrator. We restrict our analysis to cognizable offenses because the police are the first point of contact for these types of offenses. Our results don't change if we don't restrict our analysis to cognizable offenses.

²⁹ Low income respondents are defined as respondents whose household income is less than the 25th percentile of reported income in our sample.

³⁰ The registration rate is defined as registered FIRs (reported by the police) as a percentage of victimization incidents reported in our crime victimization survey.

³¹ The rate of crime registration is defined as crime incidents (registered by the relevant police service) as a percentage of victimization incidents reported in the relevant crime survey.

(42%). The FIR is an important document because it sets the process of criminal justice in motion and it is only after an FIR is registered that the police takes up investigation.

- We find that the direct experience of being confronted with a demand for unofficial payments more than doubles for complainants (respondents who suffer a victimization incident and whose complaint application was recorded by the police although an FIR may or may not have been registered) as compared to non-complainants (those who haven't suffered victimization or victims who did not report their complaint and whose complaint was not recorded by the police). The main difference in the reasons for giving unofficial payments between complainants and non-complainants is related to the registration of crime with the police. This means that citizen exposure to unofficial payments rises significantly as soon as a citizen decides to become a user of the criminal justice system. We also find that victims' direct experience with unofficial payments rises with local commercial density. This suggests that the burden of unofficial payments is higher in mixed and commercial localities that suffer much higher victimization rates. The burden of unofficial payments appears to be regressive as the magnitude of these payments is higher in areas with higher rates of victimization.
- Our respondents' experience suggests that low registration rates are a consequence of incentives in the current policing system to under-report crime at the time of registration, the complexity and ad-hoc nature of the registration process and the general unwillingness of the city police to register cases. Reform efforts will need to restructure the incentives of police officers involved in the registration process and institutionalize standardized processes that are transparent and allow citizens to raise red flags early.

This suggests that the first big challenge in citizen engagement with the criminal justice system relates to the registration of FIRs. Since the registration process is institutionalized at the level of the police station this would require structural reforms of the police station as an institution.

Challenges related to case processing and deterrence:

- We find that complainants face acute post-registration challenges related to high pendency rates and weak information and feedback loops about case progress. We find that almost 65% of the complainants in our survey have cases that were pending for between six months and one year and had not been concluded. We also find that 20% of complainants had no information about the progress of their case. This suggests that a large proportion of complainants are disengaged from the criminal justice process and this can cause considerable uncertainty and frustration. This is also likely to weaken the accountability of police officers to complainants.
- The secondary evidence³² suggests that the criminal justice system isn't ensuring effective deterrence. While our survey shows high arrest rates (55%) in the small number of cases that were concluded, Siddique's (2016) study suggests caution against using arrest rates as an indicator of effective deterrence. This is because his analysis of criminal cases in three districts of Punjab³³ finds high acquittal rates at the trial stage. He argues that high acquittal rates are an indicator of ineffective deterrence and attributes these high rates to weak police investigation and prosecution.
- However, we also find that an important cause of weak deterrence and high pendency is the "anonymity challenge" in mega-cities. This is consistent with the literature suggesting that in urban

³² Siddique (2016).

³³ As Lahore isn't one of the sample districts, the findings need to be treated as indicative and not conclusive.

contexts, a lack of knowledge about perpetrators among victims and communities makes it harder to identify and apprehend perpetrators (Glaeser and Sacerdote 1999). For Pakistan's Punjab, Cheema, Hameed and Naseer (2017) find that registered cases with untraced perpetrators increase disproportionately in metropolitan districts, suggesting that urban anonymity has emerged as a major problem in these districts. Our survey data reinforces this result. It shows that only 19% of complainants had any significant information about their perpetrators. We also show that pendency rates more than double and arrest rates fall by more than 75% when complainants don't possess any significant information about their perpetrators.

The second big challenge in citizen engagement with the criminal justice system is to build the capacity of the system to deliver effective deterrence. This will require reform of and investment in investigation and prosecution functions. However, our evidence suggests that the returns to investments in investigation and prosecution will be attenuated by the problem of urban anonymity and addressing this problem will require taking steps to improve the effectiveness of preventive policing.

3.1. Victims and police reporting

How likely are citizens to report victimization incidents to the police? Reporting is the first step victims take in their engagement with the criminal justice system. Our survey data suggests that 44% of respondents who suffered an incident say they contacted the police to report it.³⁴ The two most cited methods of contact are the 15 helpline and directly contacting the police station. Among these two methods, 29% of the respondents who reported called the helpline and 44% directly contacted the police station. We find no difference between commercial and residential respondents' tendency to report incidents to the police. We also find no difference among low income³⁵ and other respondents' tendency to report. This shows that a healthy demand exists among all types of citizens for using state forums to deal with incidents of victimization.

Our data also shows that the state's criminal justice system is the main mechanism used by citizens to deal with crime and disorder issues in Lahore. Less than 5% of our respondents report having been able to successfully deal with an issue independently of the police either on their own or through a non-state forum.³⁶ One reason for the reliance on state forums is the lack of availability of robust non-state forums.

However, a majority of citizens who suffer victimization (56%) report not having contacted the police so there is considerable room for improvement. This becomes obvious when we analyze the reasons given by the respondents for not contacting the police to report an incident (Figure 3.1). We asked victims who decided not to report to provide up to three reasons for not reporting. 60% of our respondents said that they didn't report the incident to the police because they perceive it to be ineffective and another 30% say they didn't report because the police are disinterested in solving their cases. About 15% said that they did not report the incident because their perception is that the police are either biased or because they feel that they


³⁴ This is a much higher percentage than that found for Lahore in Siddique (2013) Punjab Crime Perception Survey. Their 2009 survey provides a reporting rate of 27% for Lahore, which is much lower than our current finding.

³⁵ Low income respondents are defined as respondents whose household income is less than the 25th percentile of reported income in our sample.

³⁶ Siddique (2013) finds that weakening social norms "have made non-court dispute resolution mechanisms dysfunctional and unreliable" (pg. 178). He finds that while a healthy demand exists for using out-of-court forums for settlement, these forums remains underutilized because the absence of social norms plagues their functioning with considerable uncertainty and poor enforcement.

lack the influence needed to mediate with the police, which we classify as a perception of lack of procedural fairness. Only close to a quarter say that the crime was too minor to report.

Figure 3.1: Reasons for Not Reporting Crime to Police



Source: IDEAS Lahore Crime Victimization Survey, 2016.

Note: The Lahore Crime Victimization Survey asked the following question from respondents who were victims of crime but chose not to report it to the police; “What are the top three reasons for not reporting the crime?” Responses were then grouped into different categories. We report the results for the top four categories of responses, which are perceptions of police ineffectiveness, police disinterest, lack of procedural fairness and victims don’t consider the crime worth reporting. The sample size responding to this question is 373.

It appears that the most effective way of getting more citizens to report is to undertake measures that change citizen’s perceptions and give them confidence that the police are interested in dealing with victimization complaints and effective at dealing with them. We show below that the criminal justice system is under-performing on both these counts.

3.2. Victims and the registration challenge

The first big challenge in citizen engagement with the criminal justice system relates to the registration of the first information report (FIR). In order to get a sense of this challenge it is important to understand the steps involved in the registration process. The process from reporting to registration entails two steps: having a complaint or incident recorded by the police and the registration of an First information report (FIR). An FIR is a written document prepared by the police after they receive information about the commission of a

cognizable offense.³⁷ It is an important document because it sets the process of criminal justice in motion and it is only after an FIR is registered that the police takes up investigation. An FIR is different from complaints or incident reporting. Complaints or incident reporting imply communicating an allegation orally or in writing to be recorded in the daily diary of the police. Complaints may or may not be converted into an FIR.

Our survey data suggests that 70% of incidents reported to the police by our respondents were recorded as complaint applications. It appears that the computerized complaint management system is resulting in a high proportion of complaints (not FIRs) getting recorded.

However, this gain for citizens is offset by a low registration rate for FIRs. Table 3.1 shows that registered FIRs reported by the police in Lahore are a very small percentage of victimization incidents reported by the city’s citizens in our crime victimization survey. The police data shows that 780 FIRs per 100,000 people were registered by the police in 2015. This is 6.4% of the number of victimization incidents reported by citizens in our survey in 2016. Table 3.1 shows that this percentage is far lower than the equivalent percentage for London and the urban U.S., which suggests that Lahore is doing poorly in global terms on this indicator.

Table 3.1: Registration Rates in Global Comparison

	Victimization Rate (per 100,000) [1]	Police reported crime rate (per 100,000) [2]	Registration rate ([2] as % of [1])
Lahore	12,100	780	6.4%
Delhi	14,128	843	6%
Mumbai	16,468	127	0.7%
Urban US	15,810	3074	19.4%
London	16,300	6890	42.2%

Source: (1) The Lahore rates were calculated from the IDEAS Lahore Crime Victimization Survey 2016-17 and the Lahore Police FIR data from 2015. (2) The Delhi and Mumbai rates were calculated based on the report, Crime Victimization and Safety Perception: A Public Survey of Delhi and Mumbai, Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, 2015 and data from the National Crime Records Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs, Crime in India 2015. (3) The urban U.S. rates were calculated on the basis of NCVS Victimization Analysis Tool, (<http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=nvat>), Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2014 and FBI, Crime in the U.S., 2014. (4) The London rates were calculated based on Crime in England and Wales: Bulletin Tables, Office of National Statistics, U.K., 2016 and Office for National Statistics, U.K., Crime in England and Wales, Police Force Area Tables and Annual Trends and Demographics 2016.

Note: (1) The victimization rate is calculated by dividing the number of respondents to the Lahore CVS who report being a victim of any category of crime over the 12 months prior to the survey by the total number of respondents of the relevant survey. (2) The police-reported crime rate is the total number of registered crime cases for a relevant jurisdiction divided by the population of the relevant jurisdiction. In the case of Lahore, Delhi and Mumbai this is crime cases registered as FIRs. Both indicators are normalized per 100,000 population.


We do find that the percentage of victimization incidents registered by the police as FIRs is low in Indian cities as well (Table 3.1). It appears that low registration is a tenacious problem in South Asian mega-cities and much more work needs to be done to address this problem. Equally worrying is the fact that approximately 20% of respondents whose complaints were recorded by the police said they had no idea what the outcome of the registration process was. Getting the city’s police to register crime and institutionalize a citizen-responsive FIR registration process remains a persistent challenge. This suggests that reforming the criminal justice process must prioritize the FIR registration stage.³⁸

³⁷ Cognizable offenses are offenses where police officers have the authority to make an arrest without a warrant and to start an investigation with or without the permission of a court.

³⁸ Reducing the access costs of the criminal justice system for citizens, which is their constitutional right, also has implications for the resourcing of the criminal justice system at the level of the police and courts. With the current

Our survey asked respondents whose complaint did not get recorded to suggest up to three reasons why they thought their complaint wasn't recorded. The top three reasons suggested by these respondents relate to incentives in the current policing system to under-report crime, the complexity and ad-hoc nature of the process and general unwillingness in the city police to register cases (Figure 3.2). Our respondents' experience suggests that fixing the registration process necessitates reforming incentives of police officers involved in registration and institutionalizing transparent, standardized processes that allow citizens to raise red flags early. This would also mean revisiting the current rules around citizen feedback to ensure that they are embedded in a reformed framework of incentives and a process that is transparent and standardized. Since the registration process is institutionalized at the level of the police station, this would require structural reforms of the police station as an institution.

Figure 3.2: Top Reason for Police Failure to Record Complaints



Source: IDEAS Lahore Crime Victimization Survey, 2016.

Note: The IDEAS Lahore CVS asked the following question; "In your opinion, what are the top three reasons the police didn't record your complaint?" Responses were then grouped into different categories. We report the results for the top three categories of responses. The sample size responding to this question is 87, which is 30% of the 289 respondents who attempted to have their complaint recorded.

3.3. Complainants, unofficial payments and registration


The costs related to unofficial payments remain a major challenge. For complainants³⁹, this challenge is associated with the registration process. Our survey asked respondents the number of times the police has demanded unofficial payments from them during the last year. 20% of our sample reports such a demand being made by the police during this period. What is worrying is that more than 50% of complainants report having had direct experience with unofficial payments (Figure 3.3). We find that this percentage more than halves for non-complainants (respondents who did not suffer any victimization during this period or suffered victimization and either didn't report the incident to the police or whose report was not recorded). This

resourcing reducing registration costs is most likely to create problems further down the criminal justice chain. Therefore, reforms of the registration process will have to budget additional resources to cope with increased demand.

³⁹ These are victims whose complaint application was recorded by the police during the past 12 months. The complaint application may or may not have resulted in the registration of FIRs.

means that citizen exposure to unofficial payments rises significantly as soon as a citizen becomes a user of the criminal justice process.

Figure 3.3: Direct Experience of Unofficial Payment asked by Police between Complainants and Non-Complainants




Source: IDEAS Lahore Crime Victimization Survey, 2016.

Note: (1) The survey measured respondents' direct experience with police corruption by asking, "How many times have the police demanded an official payment from them during the last 12 months?" The sample size responding to this question is 5040, (2) Complainants are victims whose complaint application was recorded by the police during the past 12 months (an FIR may or may not have been registered) and non-complainants are respondents who did not suffer any victimization during this period or who suffered victimization and didn't report the incident or whose complaint wasn't recorded by the police, (3) The error bars represent a 95% confidence interval.

Why is there different demand for unofficial payments between complainants and non-complainants? Our survey asked respondents who had reported direct experience with unofficial payments to state the purpose of making the last payment. Figure 3.4 reports this information separately for complainants and non-complainants. The big difference in the direct experience with unofficial payments between these respondents relates to the registration process. Close to 40% of complainants state that their last unofficial payment related to the registration of crime with the police, while this percentage is close to only 7% for non-complainants. This reinforces our earlier finding that the users of the criminal justice system bear an excessive cost that is related to registration of crime with the police. The other reasons for unofficial payments relate to stop and search, traffic violation and extortion by the police. This evidence shows that registration is prone to demands for unofficial payments, which in turn also cause the process to be perceived as ad-hoc, opaque and discretionary.

Figure 3.4: Purpose of Last Experience with Unofficial Payment⁴⁰




Source: IDEAS Lahore Crime Victimization Survey, 2016.

Note: (1) Respondents who reported direct experience with corruption were asked follow up questions about the reason for the last unofficial payment; (2) The sample size responding to this question is 5040; (3) Complainants are victims whose complaint was recorded by the police during the past 12 months (an FIR may or may not have been registered) and non-complainants are respondents who did not suffer any victimization during this period or who suffered victimization and didn't report the incident or whose incident wasn't recorded by the police.

We also find that victims' direct experience with unofficial payments is positively correlated to local commercial density. Whereas 12% of respondents who have suffered victimization in a residential locality report direct experience with unofficial payments, this number rises to 27% in the case of mixed and commercial localities (Figure 3.5). This suggests that the burden of unofficial payments is higher in localities with high victimization rates. We know from the last chapter that mixed and commercial localities have a higher need for services related to the criminal justice system, and it appears that the demand for unofficial payments is adjusting to meet this higher demand for services.

⁴⁰ We also ran regressions that analyzed the differences in the stated purpose of the last unofficial payment between non-victims, victims who didn't report and complainants. Our outcome variables were the percentage of respondents saying that the last unofficial payment related to registration, traffic violation, police extortion and stop and search respectively. The analysis shows that statistical differences only exist between complainants and non-victims for registration and the result survives even if we control for police station fixed effects. There were no statistically significant differences between different types of respondents if the purpose of the last payment related to traffic violation, police extortion and stop and search.

Figure 3.5: Unofficial Payments by Locality Type



Source: IDEAS Lahore Crime Victimization Survey, 2016.

Note: (1) The survey measured respondents' direct experience with police corruption by asking whether they had paid a bribe to a policeman in the past 12 months; (2) The sample size responding to this question is 5040; (3) The error bars represent a 95% confidence interval.

3.4. Victims and procedural uncertainty

There are a number of other challenges faced by victims after their complaint is recorded. A high incidence of case pendency is one such challenge. Approximately 65% of complainants had pending cases that had not been concluded.⁴¹ The pendency rate was equally high in cases that were between six months and one year old,⁴² suggesting that the pendency result isn't driven by the age profile of incidents. Pendency rates are extremely high in theft and robbery cases where greater than two-thirds of complaints that are six months to one year old remain pending. Such high pendency rates would make it difficult for the criminal justice system to adhere to the benchmarks set for criminal cases by law in the Criminal Procedure Code and the Police Rules that require a final report (even an interim one if the case is not finalized) to be submitted to the court within seventeen days of launching an FIR for all registered cases. However, the assumption is that the report

⁴¹ Our survey only asked about cases of victimization that a respondent suffered during the past year.

⁴² We restrict cases to this duration because our question asked respondents to record incidents of victimization that they suffered during the past year.

would be submitted after the arrest of the perpetrators. Since in many cases there are no arrests in this period, such reports are submitted quite late in a large percentage of registered cases.

Another challenge is the lack of information among complainants about the progress of their case. 20% of complainants report having no information about the outcome of their complaint. This suggests that the current process has weak feedback loops for citizens at different stages of the process, which can lead to frustration and disengagement. Weak feedback loops are also likely to weaken the accountability of police officers to complainants.

An important reason for high pendency rates is the anonymity challenge unique to the urban context. It is well-recognized in the literature that anonymity is higher in metropolitan cities and this has consequences for the effectiveness of criminal justice outcomes in these contexts (Glaeser and Sacerdote 1999, Wilson and Herrenstein 1980). Putnam (1993) and Wirth (1938) argue that community-based sanctions are likely to be weaker in cities because people are more transient and anonymous, which is expected to weaken the cohesiveness of communities. An important underlying channel of weak deterrence in urban contexts is the lack of knowledge about perpetrators among victims and communities, which makes it harder to identify and apprehend perpetrators. For Pakistan's Punjab, Cheema, Hameed and Naseer (2017) find that the percentage of untraced cases increases by three times in districts with metropolitan cities compared to rural districts. This evidence suggests that the anonymity challenge is particularly severe in districts with metropolitan cities in Punjab.


The IDEAS Lahore CVS supports the hypothesis that a lack of information about perpetrators leads to high pendency rates. We find that only 19% of complainants in our data had any significant information about their perpetrators, which appears to be a consequence of the nature of urban living. We also find that the pendency rate is close to 40% in cases where a victim had some relevant information about their perpetrator and this percentage rises to around 90% in cases where the victim did not have any information (Figure 3.6).

Interviews with police officers suggest that reasons for poor information about perpetrators include the short working lives of criminals in the city (which results in high turnover among the population of offenders⁴³) and the mobile nature of street crime in the city.⁴⁴ We show below that this feature of the urban context is not only likely to affect pendency rates, it is also likely to affect the outcomes of the criminal justice process.

⁴³ We want to thank Mr. Umer Riaz Cheema (Punjab Police) for bringing this point to our attention. His working for a division of Lahore shows high turnover among the population of criminals who appear to retire at an early age and are replaced by new younger faces.

⁴⁴ The mobile nature of street crime in the city makes it harder for local residents and police to identify perpetrators unless they continue to repeat offenses in a local area.

Figure 3.6: Pendency Rates and Information about the Perpetrator



Source: IDEAS Lahore Crime Victimization Survey, 2016.

Note: (1) The survey asked respondents who reported at least one incident of victimization to the police the following question: “Do you know anything about any one of the offenders involved in the incident?” (2) The sample size responding to this question is 202; (3) The error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

3.5. Victims and the effectiveness of criminal justice outcomes

How effective is the criminal justice system at creating deterrence – i.e. arresting perpetrators and recovering stolen property? Our survey data shows that the reported arrest rate is approximately 55% in cases where an investigation was concluded and the recovery rate in property crime cases is around 18%.⁴⁵ This recovery rate is comparable to other global metropolitan areas for which we have comparable data.⁴⁶ However, it is important to recognize that this data in itself may provide a misleading indicator of the effectiveness of criminal justice outcomes because of high acquittal rates during the trial stage.

Unfortunately, our survey does not extend to the trial stage and therefore we must rely on secondary evidence to analyze this issue. The most rigorous evidence on this issue is provided by Siddique (2016), who conducts a detailed statistical analysis of 707 criminal cases in the criminal courts of Multan, Bahawalpur and Muzaffargarh districts. Although his analysis does not include Lahore, his results suggest caution in using arrests as a final outcome of the criminal justice process. He finds high acquittal rates in criminal cases with a 68% acquittal rate in cases involving crime against persons and a 67% rate in cases of crime against property.


⁴⁵ The sample size of these types of cases is extremely small at 41 incidents and therefore these results need to be treated with caution.

⁴⁶ The US National Crime and Victimization Survey (2015) reports a recovery rate of 26.1% on all stolen items. The Crime in India statistical report (2015) reports a recovery rate for Delhi of 17.5% in the case of stolen property. However, the measures used by the Crime in India statistics (2015) is the total value of property recovered as a percentage of total value stolen. This is different from the measure employed by us and the NCVS – the percentage of cases in which property was recovered.

He also finds that only 10% of cases are judged on merits and 10-15% are disposed through compromise. He attributes the high acquittal rates to weak police investigations and prosecutions. This raises the concern that high acquittal rates are also hurting the ability of Lahore’s criminal justice system to create effective deterrence.

The urban anonymity challenge also appears to be an important factor eroding the effectiveness of deterrence by reducing the arrest rate. We find that the lack of information about the perpetrator also has a significant effect on the reduction in the arrest rate for complaints that have been concluded. We find that the arrest rate is close to 80% in cases where a victim has information about their perpetrator and this percentage falls to around 20% in cases where the victim did not have any information (Figure 3.7). The anonymity issue is partly a consequence of evolving jurisprudence where an accused being nominated in an FIR has become almost a sine qua non for conviction. This suggests that structural features of the urban context are likely to affect the outcomes of investigation and prosecution and investments in prevention may proffer higher returns for deterrence outcomes. It also suggests that the returns to investment in investigation and prosecution functions may be attenuated because of the urban anonymity challenge.

Figure 3.7: Arrest Rates and Information about the Perpetrator



Source: IDEAS Lahore Crime Victimization Survey, 2016.

Note: (1) The survey asked respondents who had reported at least one incident of victimization and reported it to the police the following question: “Do you know anything about any one of the offenders involved in the incident?” (2) The sample size responding to this question is 41; (3) The error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

3.6. Conclusion

Our evidence suggests that the registration of FIRs remains a persistent challenge that is raising the cost of victim engagement with the criminal justice process. We also find that the registration process increases the burden of unofficial payments for complainants. Therefore, the reform of the FIR registration process has to be a core objective of police reforms and this will require restructuring incentives and processes at the police station. This evidence also points to the fact that recent and often ambitious reform efforts (such as those enacted as part of the Police Order 2002 and the recent interventions centered on information technology) have left the colonial institutional framework intact at the police station level. This is acting as a major hindrance for citizens' access to the justice system at a time when the need for its services is growing.

We also find that the urban anonymity challenge (lack of knowledge about perpetrators among victims and communities) and the mobile nature of criminal activity are adversely affecting case processing as well as deterrence outcomes. The global literature (see Chapter 5 for a review) shows that reactive investigations are an ineffective way of creating deterrence in this context. As a result, much more emphasis has shifted in these contexts to smart preventive patrolling, which aims to alter the costs and benefits to criminals working in areas that attract crime. The Punjab Police Integrated Command, Control and Communication Centre (PPIC3) set up by the Punjab Safe Cities Authority (PSCA) has built global standard technological capacity that integrates calls for service, real time surveillance using CCTVs and mobile cameras and rapid response units tied to a dispatch center. This has enhanced the Lahore Police's capacity for smart preventive patrolling and policing. However, the effectiveness of this system may be diluted because of an unreformed registration process, which raises coordination costs between citizens, PPIC3 and the investigation officers and creates time delays in the ability of the system to respond to complaints. PPIC3 in spite of its tremendous potential is acting as a supplier of information to an unreformed police station system rather than acting as a hub that can mobilize and deploy resources swiftly in response to calls-for-service complaints. Therefore, reform of the registration process is also essential to maximize the social returns to the PPIC3 investment.

There is also recognition that in mega-cities it is difficult to engage in smart preventive patrolling at scale and that smart prevention requires collaboration with communities in high-crime neighborhoods. The evidence strongly suggests that improving the outcomes from policing and the criminal justice system for Lahore's citizens will not be possible unless we move in this direction. This raises the important question: How much trust do citizens repose in the policing system? Police-community collaboration will not be possible unless there is sufficient trust between the citizens and the police. The next chapter examines the evidence on whether this is indeed the case.

Chapter 4: Citizen Perceptions of the Police

An important finding of our survey, discussed in Chapter 2, is that the likelihood of victimization is directly related to the level of commercial density of a locality. This suggests that a critical public safety challenge for the Government of Punjab is to effectively police commercial areas, which are public and where large numbers of people agglomerate. We have argued that it is difficult to effectively police these areas without the cooperation of the community. To assess the feasibility of citizen-community relations, it is important to gauge the level of trust that citizens have in the city's police service.

Chapter 3 documents the persisting challenges related to the registration and pendency of cases and unofficial payments, which make it costly for citizens to mediate the state's criminal justice. In addition, there is concern that the system's ability to ensure effective deterrence appears to be weak, partly because of the anonymity challenge posed by the city's urban context. We also show that the cost of poor outcomes is felt most severely by victims of crime who bear the effort and time costs of reporting their cases to the police. Therefore, it is important to know the extent to which these less than satisfactory outcomes tend to spill over into victims' perception of the police.

The purpose of this chapter is to provide evidence on perceptions of the police among the city's citizens. We provide evidence on citizens' perception about police effectiveness, procedural fairness associated with the criminal justice system and legitimacy, honesty and trustworthiness of the city police service. We also present evidence on citizens' willingness to cooperate with the police. We present this evidence for victims and non-victims given that their experience with the criminal justice system is very different. We also assess the difference in residential, mixed and commercial respondents' willingness to cooperate with the police. This evidence allows us to assess the strength of the relationship between the citizenry and the police along different dimensions. Analyzing citizen perceptions is important because it is difficult to see how effective and legitimate policing can be institutionalized without the existence of a strong relationship of trust between citizens and the police.

Our main findings are:⁴⁷

- While a majority of citizens perceive the police to be effective, a minority thinks they are trustworthy and procedurally fair and an even smaller minority thinks they are honest. Hence, a very low percentage of respondents say that they have an obligation to obey the police. Citizens also have a strong perception that the police and its procedures are biased in favor of the wealthy and the connected. The literature argues that two important components of police legitimacy are generalized trust and an obligation to obey, and the evidence suggests that the city police are not doing well on either. In short, the relationship between citizens and the police is broken and needs to be fixed.
- Perceptions of the police are poorer on all measures among citizens who have suffered victimization compared to the group of citizens who have not suffered an incident of victimization. A much higher proportion of victims also feel that the police exhibit bias in favor of citizens who are wealthy. That is, prospective users of the criminal justice system have poorer perceptions of the police than other citizens. This suggests that any attempts to build trust between citizens and the police must be grounded in real reforms of the criminal justice system, its institutional framework and its processes.

⁴⁷ The figures and tables used in this chapter present representative estimates at the Lahore level by weighting our sample using inverse probability weights. For details, see Appendix 1.

- The silver lining is that in spite of these poor perceptions the willingness of the community to cooperate with the police is high. Our interpretation of this finding is that citizens are willing to cooperate because of the lack of availability of robust non-state forums, which creates a comparative advantage for the state system. The willingness of the citizens to cooperate with the police gives reformers of the police system something to build on.
- The strongest predictor of the two components of police legitimacy (generalized trust and an obligation to obey) is honesty followed by police effectiveness. Procedural fairness is a weak predictor of generalized trust and is insignificantly correlated with an obligation to obey. This suggests a need to introduce tangible reform measures at the police station level that reduce corruption and improve prevention, investigation and prosecution outcomes. The recently introduced interventions by the Government of Punjab⁴⁸ are only likely to have an impact on police legitimacy if they reduce the burden of unofficial payments and tangibly improve deterrence outcomes. It is, therefore, important that the government evaluates the impact of these interventions on the reduction of unofficial payments and on an improvement of deterrence outcomes. We discuss potential directions for reform in Chapter 5.

4.1. Definition and motivation for perception measures

We begin by defining the perception measures used in our survey. We also provide our motivation for choosing these measures.

There is a growing literature in criminology that recognizes legitimacy as an important pre-condition of policing in democracies (Bradford 2014, 2006a and b). It argues that without legitimacy, policing institutions resort to force and repression, which undermines their claim as acting on behalf of and in cooperation with the public they are meant to serve (Tyler 2009, Schulhofer et. al. 2011 and Jackson et. al. 2014 and 2012). A big challenge for policing in post-colonial societies is to make the transition from institutions that exist above the public to institutions that govern with legitimacy conferred by the public. Legitimacy is also important because the literature shows that authorities act in fair and just ways if they are seen as legitimate (Terril 2001, McCluskey 2003) and citizens are much more likely to cooperate with the police if they see it as a legitimate institution (Tyler 2011a, Tyler and Jackson 2014, Bradford et. al. 2014).

Following the literature we begin by documenting citizens' perception of two components of police legitimacy: a felt obligation to obey legal authorities and generalized trust in the police (Jackson et. al. 2014). The standard definition of legitimacy used in the literature rests on the notion that to be legitimate, citizens must obey the instructions of police officers as the law grants officers the authority to dictate appropriate behavior. The literature also argues that it is difficult for there to be legitimacy without generalized trust. We measure willingness to obey through an index based on respondent agreement or strong agreement with the following three statements: (a) "You should do what the police tell you to do even when you do not understand the reasons for their decisions", (b) "You should do what the police tell you to do even when you disagree with their decisions", and (c) "You should do what the police tell you to do even when you do not like the way they treat you".⁴⁹ We measure generalized trust by asking citizens whether they strongly agree or agree with the statement that "the Lahore police are trustworthy".⁵⁰

⁴⁸ For a review of recent interventions see MIT Technology Review Pakistan (2017).

⁴⁹ We use a similar battery of questions to measure citizens' felt duty to obey the police as Jackson et. al. (2014). Their study on police corruption and legitimacy in Lahore combines these indicators of felt duty to obey with generalized trust

The procedural justice theory (PJT) of criminology argues that citizens are less interested in the outcomes of the justice system and are more interested in the processes by which decisions are reached and in the motivations behind the actions of agents of the justice system (Tyler 2006a and b). The argument is that citizens are more likely to regard the police as legitimate and defer to its authority if they believe that the power of the police is balanced by due process and they are acting within the bounds of the law (Meares and Tyler 2014). PJT assumes the citizens are less interested in the effectiveness of authority as a mechanism of legitimacy than in due process. The literature suggests that adherence to procedural justice strengthens the governance bond between citizens and the police (Hough 2013 and Tyler 2011 b). Therefore, we collate evidence on citizens' perception about the existence of procedural fairness in policing. We measure procedural fairness through an index based on respondent agreement or strong agreement with the following statements: (a) "The police treats everyone with respect", (b) "The police treats people they suspect of breaking the law harshly", (c) "The police respects people's rights", (d) "The police clearly explain the reasons for their actions". We measure victim disagreement with the following statement: (a) "The police enjoy pushing people around and giving them a hard time".⁵¹

Jackson et. al. (2014) argue that in contrast to motive-based trust stemming from procedural fairness, citizens may follow an instrumental motivation to legitimate the police. This means that citizens will legitimize the police if they believe that the police are effective in providing safety and are acting as a strong deterrent force. We capture citizens' instrumental motivation through an index based on respondent agreement or strong agreement with the following six statements: (a) "The police are well-trained to pursue criminals", (b) "The police respond promptly to calls about crimes", (c) "The police arrive where you need them", (d) "The police are always able to provide the assistance the public needs from them", (e) "The police do well at controlling violent crime" and (f) "The police do well at controlling property crime".⁵²

Finally, we collate citizen's perception about police honesty as this is likely to influence perceptions about effectiveness, fairness and legitimacy (Jackson et. al. 2014). We measure citizen perception about corruption on the basis of strong agreement or agreement with the statement that "the Lahore police are usually honest".

4.2. Differences in citizen perception of police legitimacy

What is the perception of police legitimacy among the citizenry? We answer this question by providing evidence on citizen perceptions about the two components of police legitimacy discussed above (Figure 4.1). We present separate evidence for respondents who have suffered victimization and those who have not, as our evidence suggests that they have had very different experiences with the criminal justice system.


to create a composite measure of police legitimacy. Jackson et. al. (2012) also use these questions in a study on police legitimacy and citizen trust in England and Wales, to measure citizens' obligation to obey the police. The advantage of using this battery is that it has been tested and allows cross-country comparisons to be made.

⁵⁰ We use similar questions to measure generalized trust as Jackson et. al. (2014). They combine their measure of generalized trust with felt duty to obey the police to create a measure of police legitimacy.

⁵¹ We use a similar battery of questions to measure citizens' perception of procedural fairness as Jackson et. al. (2014).

⁵² Jackson et. al. (2014) use this set of questions to measure police effectiveness.

Figure 4.1: Citizen Perception of Police Legitimacy



Source: IDEAS Lahore Crime Victimization Survey, 2016.

Note: (1) Citizens’ willingness to obey the police is measured through respondents’ strong agreement and agreement with the following statements, on a five-point Likert scale where 1=strongly agree, 3=neither agree nor disagree, 5=strongly disagree: (a) “You should do what the police tell you to do even when you do not understand the reasons for their decisions”, (b) “You should do what the police tell you to do even when you disagree with their decisions”, (c) “You should do what the police tell you to do even when you do not like the way they treat you”. The data in the figure on the right represents strong agreement or agreement to these questions. Generalized trust is measured by asking citizens how strongly they agree or disagree with the statement that “the Lahore police are trustworthy”. The data in the figure on the left represents strong agreement or agreement to this question. (2) The error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

There are two important findings here. The legitimacy of the police with citizens is low. Less than one-third of respondents agree that the Lahore police are trustworthy and less than 5% agree that they have a willingness to obey the police. We find no differences in citizen perceptions of police legitimacy by the social and economic status of respondents. This suggests that building the legitimacy of the police with the citizenry must be a first-order policy objective of both the government and the Lahore police. We discuss directions for reform in the next chapter.


Generalized trust in the police is much lower among the main users of the criminal justice system (Figure 4.1) i.e. citizens who have suffered victimization and have either used the system or have thought about using it. This suggests that generalized trust in the police erodes if a citizen becomes a prospective user of the system. What is clear is that systemic reform is needed as currently the city police’s legitimacy is not very high with the citizenry and this is likely to constrain both the effectiveness of the system and its moral authority. On what dimensions is the police’s legitimacy suffering?

4.3. Differences in citizen perception of police effectiveness

Over 40% of citizens who have not suffered victimization believe that the police are effective in undertaking its various tasks (Figure 4.2). It is interesting to note that the percentage of citizens saying that the police are

effective is much higher than the percentage saying that they are trustworthy. This can be seen by comparing Figures 4.2 and 4.1. We find no differences in citizen perception of police effectiveness by the social and economic status of respondents.

Figure 4.2: Citizen Perception of Police Effectiveness



Source: IDEAS Lahore Crime Victimization Survey, 2016.

Note: (1) The survey measures citizens’ perceptions of police effectiveness through respondents’ strong agreement and agreement with the following statements, on a five-point Likert scale where 1=strongly agree, 3=neither agree nor disagree, 5=strongly disagree: (a) “The police are well-trained to pursue criminals”, (b) “The police respond promptly to calls about crimes”, (c) “The police arrive where you need them”, (d) “The police are always able to provide the assistance the public needs from them”, (e) “The police do well at controlling violent crime” and (f) “The police do well at controlling property crime”. The data in the figure represents strong agreement or agreement to these questions. (2) The error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.


The worrying finding is that the perception of police effectiveness falls substantially for citizens who have suffered victimization compared to others (Figure 4.2). As pointed out earlier, these are prospective users of the justice system. It appears that deepening legitimacy will require a tangible set of improvements in the deterrence outcomes of the criminal justice system.

4.4. Differences in citizen perception of procedural fairness

A smaller percentage of citizens (less than one-third) who have not suffered victimization believe that the system is procedurally fair (Figure 4.3) compared to the percentage who think the police are effective (Figure

4.2). Again, we find no differences in citizen perception of procedural fairness by the social and economic status of respondents. Perceptions of lack of procedural fairness could be one reason why a substantial percentage of citizens choose not to report their cases to the police.

Figure 4.3: Citizen Perception of Procedural Fairness



Source: IDEAS Lahore Crime Victimization Survey, 2016.


Note: (1) The survey measures procedural fairness through respondents' agreement with the following statements, on a five-point Likert scale where 1=strongly agree, 3=neither agree nor disagree, 5=strongly disagree: (a) "The police treats everyone with respect", (b) "The police treats people they suspect of breaking the law harshly", (c) "The police respects people's rights", (d) "The police clearly explain the reasons for their actions". Victim disagreement is measured with the following statement: (a) "The police enjoy pushing people around and giving them a hard time".⁵³ (2) The error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Again, the perception of procedural fairness falls significantly among citizens who have suffered victimization (Figure 4.3). This is in line with our findings in the last chapter about the high costs that citizens face in mediating the system. This reinforces the conclusion reached in the last chapter that there is an urgent need to reform the procedures and institutional processes of the criminal justice system.

Currently there is a strong perception among citizens that the police are biased agents. We asked our respondents whether they thought that wealth and connections matter for how an individual is treated by the police. Around two-thirds of citizens think that wealth and connections matter for how an individual is treated by the police (Figure 4.4). In the case of victims the proportion saying wealth matters increases by 10 percentage points, which is a significant increase. This shows that the citizens' perception is that the system is not just procedurally unfair, it is also biased in favor of the wealthy and the connected.

⁵³ We use a similar battery of questions to measure citizens' trust in procedural fairness as Jackson et. al. (2014).

Figure 4.4: Citizen Perception of Police Bias




Source: IDEAS Lahore Crime Victimization Survey, 2016.

Note: (1) The survey measures citizens' perception of police bias by asking them what factors they think affect how an individual is treated by the police. (2) The error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

4.5. Differences in citizen perception of police honesty

Less than one-third of respondents who have not suffered victimization think that the city police are honest (Figure 4.5). Again, this percentage falls for citizens who have suffered victimization and have either used or have contemplated using the criminal justice system. We also find no differences in citizen perception of police honesty by the social and economic status of respondents. The irony in all these figures is that the main users of police services have worse perceptions of the police on different metrics compared to the general citizenry that has not needed to use the criminal justice system in the recent past.

Figure 4.5: Citizen Perception of Police Honesty




Source: IDEAS Lahore Crime Victimization Survey, 2016.

Note: (1) The respondents are asked the following question: “Do you think the Lahore police are usually honest?” Responses are coded on a five-point Likert scale where 1=strongly agree, 3=neither agree nor disagree and 5=strongly disagree. The data in the figure represents strong agreement or agreement to this question. (2) The error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

4.6. Is there a willingness to cooperate with the police?

The good news is that there is a healthy willingness among the citizenry to cooperate with the police (Figure 4.6) in spite of the challenges associated with citizen perceptions of police legitimacy, trust, fairness, effectiveness and honesty. We asked citizens whether they would be willing to cooperate with the police as a witness or a member of a neighborhood watch if they observed a crime taking place. More than two-thirds of respondents express a willingness to cooperate with the police (Figure 4.6).

Figure 4.6: Are Citizens Willing to Cooperate with the Police?




Source: IDEAS Lahore Crime Victimization Survey, 2016.

Note: (1) The survey measures citizens' willingness to cooperate with the police through vignettes. Respondents are asked to consider the following situations: 1. A loud, violent family quarrel, 2. Suspected drug users, 3. Suspicious people, 4. Somebody being assaulted, 5. Somebody's property being stolen, 6. Somebody being murdered. Respondents are asked how willing, on a five-point Likert scale (1=highly willing, 5=highly unwilling), would they be to act as a witness in the subsequent police investigation of the incident. Responses that suggest high willingness or willingness to the six vignettes are used to create a combined index of willingness to cooperate with the police. (2) The error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

What is worrying is that willingness drops among citizens who have suffered victimization (Figure 4.6) and among respondents in commercial localities (Figure 4.7) who are more exposed to victimization incidents. It appears that the weak relationship between the police and the citizenry is taking a toll on the willingness of the most affected citizens to work with the police. However, overall magnitudes remain healthy even among these two groups of citizens, which is a silver lining for reformers. We also find no differences in citizen willingness to cooperate by the social and economic status of respondents.

Figure 4.7: Citizens' Willingness to Cooperate with the Police by Locality Type



Source: IDEAS Lahore Crime Victimization Survey, 2016.

Note: (1) The survey measures citizens' willingness to cooperate with the police through vignettes. Respondents are asked to consider the following situations: 1. A loud, violent family quarrel, 2. Suspected drug users, 3. Suspicious people, 4. Somebody being assaulted, 5. Somebody's property being stolen, 6. Somebody being murdered. Respondents are asked how willing, on a five-point Likert scale (1=highly willing, 5=highly unwilling), would they be to act as a witness in the subsequent police investigation of the incident. Responses that suggest high willingness or willingness to the six vignettes are used to create a combined index of willingness to cooperate with the police. (2) The error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.


4.7. The correlates of generalized trust and obligation to obey

Which is a stronger correlate of generalized trust: police effectiveness, procedural fairness or police honesty? Answering this question is important to give direction to future reform thinking being undertaken by policymakers and parliamentarians. We answer this question by running a regression where the dependent variable is generalized trust and the explanatory variables include police effectiveness, procedural fairness and police honesty. The regression includes grid-fixed effects, which means that we are estimating the correlation between generalized trust and these three explanatory variables after controlling for all the different attributes between grids that don't vary with time. We focus on generalized trust as it is an important component of police legitimacy. We report results for both victims and non-victims.

Figure 4.8 shows the increase in the percentage of respondents saying the police are trustworthy if there is a 100% increase (doubling) of the percentage of people saying that police had become effective or procedurally fair or honest. It shows that the strongest correlate of generalized trust is improvement in honesty followed

by an improvement in effectiveness. Procedural fairness is the weakest correlate of generalized trust. It shows that an 100% increase in the percentage of respondents saying the police are honest will result in 50% more people saying that the police are trustworthy. Similarly, an 100% increase in the percentage of respondents saying that the police are effective will result in a 15% increase in the percentage of people saying the police are trustworthy. This suggests that perceived honesty is the stronger predictor of generalized trust followed by perceived effectiveness.

Figure 4.8: Correlates of Generalized Trust




Source: IDEAS Lahore Crime Victimization Survey, 2016.

Note: On the definition of variables see notes to figures 4.2, 4.3, 4.5

We find a similar pattern in the case of obligation to obey (Figure 4.9). Again, perceived honesty is the strongest predictor of the obligation to obey followed by perceived effectiveness. An 100% increase in the percentage of people saying the police is honest results in a 7.5% increase in the percentage of people saying that they are obliged to obey the police. An 100% increase in effectiveness will only result in around a 3% increase in the percentage of people saying that they are obliged to obey the police. Procedural fairness is not correlated with an obligation to obey.

Figure 4.8: Correlates of Obligation to Obey Police



Source: IDEAS Lahore Crime Victimization Survey, 2016.

Note: On the definition of variables see notes to figures 4.2, 4.3, 4.5

4.8. Conclusion

There are a number of important implications of these findings for reform thinking. The most important implication is that reforms designed to create police legitimacy have to prioritize interventions that build a perception of police honesty and effectiveness among citizens. We know from Chapter 3 that the burden of unofficial payments is much higher on complainants (the main users of the criminal justice system) and a large part of this burden is related to the registration of cases. Therefore, reforming the registration process has to be a core priority of future reforms.

We also know from Chapter 3 that the registration process is plagued with incentives in police stations to under-report crime and involves a complex and ad-hoc process in the eyes of victims. Furthermore, the process has weak feedback loops with complainants that cause considerable uncertainty and frustration. Effective reforms will need to restructure the incentives of police station officers and institutionalize standardized processes at the police station level that enable citizens to raise red flags early.

There is incipient evidence that the budgets available to police stations do not create adequate provision for operational expenses and the provision for the cost of investigation is around 4% of its actual requirement.⁵⁴ Under-budgeting institutionalizes the demand for unofficial payments in police stations and legitimizes its use in the eyes of the police. This weakens the accountability of police stations and enables abuses of power at the expense of victims. Restructuring the institutional framework for allocating budgets to police stations has to be an important component of reforms.

Building a perception of honesty would also require dispelling the perception that the police is biased in favor of the wealthy and politically connected. This is a strong piece of evidence for instilling rule of law and equal applications of laws and it tells us how far we are from institutionalizing these principles. Instilling these principles will involve embedding effective police accountability through de-politicized and citizen-centric mechanisms.

Building a perception of effectiveness will require enhancing public safety around property crime in localities with high commercial densities. We know from Chapter 2 that crime tends to concentrate in these types of localities and we also know that property-related victimization imposes a heavy cost on the average citizen in terms of lost income. Chapter 3 shows that the effectiveness of deterrence outcomes is undermined by the urban anonymity challenge. This is the lack of knowledge about perpetrators among victims and communities, which is making it harder to identify and apprehend offenders. This challenge is magnified by the mobile nature of criminal activity in commercial localities. In this context, effective deterrence would require the police to build the capacity for smart and swift prevention to deter criminals as we would expect the ability of reactive investigations in creating deterrence is likely to be weak.

⁵⁴ Report presented by Regional Police Office Sheikhpura to the Inspector General of Police Punjab.

Chapter 5: Reform Insights for the City Police

While Lahore fares much better in terms of criminal victimization and citizens' perception of public safety than other global cities, it continues to face a number of critical challenges related to criminal victimization and the criminal justice system. Property crime has been escalating at a rapid rate in the past decade and its rate of growth has only recently slowed down. An important contribution of this report is that it provides evidence showing that property-related victimization dominates crime in the city and it tends to concentrate in the commercial areas of the city. We also find that property-related victimization imposes a heavy economic loss on citizens of the city. It appears that perpetrators tend to target areas with high commercial density as they offer high net returns to criminal activity because they are poorly guarded and provide access to many potential targets. **An important challenge for public safety policy is to give protection to the citizen against property crime in areas of the city that are public and where large numbers of people agglomerate.**

We also find that the city's criminal justice system may not be acting as an effective mechanism of deterrence as the ability of the system to penalize perpetrators is low.⁵⁵ An important reason for the inability of the system to create effective deterrence is the anonymity challenge related to the urban context. We find that only 19% of victims in our data were able to provide any significant attributes of their perpetrators and that lack of information about perpetrators has an adverse effect on arrest rates. **The second challenge for public safety policy in Lahore is to devise innovative strategies that can improve deterrence outcomes in a context of poor information about perpetrators and weak judicial deterrence.**

We also find that victims face high costs associated with the process of registering cases and that the system is facing a problem of low registration rates. We also find that victims face a high burden of unofficial payments related to registration and we are concerned that weaknesses in the registration process may be constraining the potential inherent in the global standard PPIC3 technology that has been institutionalized in Lahore. **The third challenge is to reform the registration process in order to lower the cost of accessing the criminal justice system for victims and to catalyze the potential of the new PPIC3 technology as a hub of smart prevention.**

Addressing these challenges is important because our analysis suggests that the strongest correlate of police legitimacy is a perception among citizens that the police are honest and effective. It is difficult to see how the currently low levels of police legitimacy with the public can be turned around without reforms that lower the burden of unofficial payments for victims, increase the perception of police honesty and increase the effectiveness of the police in lowering the burden of crime.

The main purpose of this report is to present a detailed diagnostic on the facts about victimization in the city including the often under-emphasized spatial dimension of victimization; the nature and cost of citizen engagement with the criminal justice system; the deterrence outcomes of the system and the evidence on the strength of the relationship between citizens and the police along different dimensions. The evidence presented in this report strongly points towards the need for systemic reform. While providing a comprehensive and actionable reform plan is beyond the scope of this report, this chapter responds to the findings about crime concentration and the deterrence challenges related to urban anonymity by highlighting

⁵⁵ This is based on Siddique's (2016) study that shows that the criminal justice system in Punjab is plagued with high acquittal rates.

innovative approaches to crime control that move beyond the status quo and, in our view, need to be adopted as an integral part of an effective reform package. We also highlight some immediate measures that are needed to build citizen trust in the police and augment police legitimacy.

The chapter also provides evidence on what types of strategies tend to resonate with citizens. It is important to reiterate that structural reforms are needed in this important area of public service delivery. Reform will not only benefit citizens, they will also be essential for the future sanctity of the police as an institution. Eroding legitimacy will make it harder for the police to receive political and public support for resources and reforms that are needed to modernize it.

5.1. Improving the Deterrence Capacity of the System

Learning from other contexts

The traditional model of crime control in Pakistan relies on investigators to conduct investigations to hold offenders accountable on a case-to-case basis and generate deterrence through arrests and convictions. This is a reactive or retrospective model of deterrence. The big challenge for this model of policing in Lahore comes from urban anonymity and mobile criminal activity, which appear to erode the effectiveness of this model in terms of deterrence. This finding, however, is not surprising. A series of research studies in the U.S. in the 1970s and 1980s provide rigorous evidence that the standard model of policing was not functioning well as a mechanism of deterrence in the American urban environment (Glaeser and Sacerdote 1999, Bayley 1998, Greenwood et. al. 1975 and Greenwood et. al. 1977, Eck 1983, Braga et. al. 2012b), especially with regard to volume crimes like burglary, robbery and larceny.

The landmark study conducted by Rand in 1975 (Greenwood et. al. 1975), found that, “the most serious crimes are solved by the responding patrol officer through information obtained from the victim or victims, rather than leads developed by investigators; in more than half of the cases solved, the suspect’s identity is known or easily determined at the time the crime is reported to police; an investigator’s time is largely consumed reviewing reports, documenting files, and attempting to locate and interview victims on cases that experience has shown are unlikely to be solved; and many investigations are conducted without any hope of developing leads, but simply to satisfy victims’ expectations” (Braga et. al. 2012b, pg. 6). Reiss Jr. (1971) showed earlier that 87% of all arrests observed by him were made by patrol officers who were first responders and the probability of arrest was a function of the availability of eyewitness testimony of victims and witnesses. This finding was also articulated by Reiss and Bordua (1967), who argued that many crimes “solve themselves in the sense that the violator is ‘known’ to the complainant or to the police at the time the crime initially comes to the attention of the police.” Clearly in the case of Lahore, many crimes cannot solve themselves because of the urban anonymity challenge and this evidence needs to be taken seriously by reformers.

The challenge for reformers is to suggest innovative interventions that can strengthen deterrence in an environment where information with victims and the police is sparse. We would expect standard deterrence measures to be ineffective in this context. Investment in forensic technology, which has been undertaken by the Government of Punjab over the past five years, is a step in the right direction but its effects will only materialize in the long-run as the database matures. However, what can be done in the short-run?

Smart preventive patrol and unleashing the potential of the PPIC3 technology

In our view, the police need to innovate and move beyond the traditional model of reactive policing and build the capacity for proactive, preventive patrolling in Lahore that seeks to alter the cost and benefit of criminal activity in neighborhoods with high commercial density. It would do well to begin by reviewing innovations that were introduced in the US in the 1990s and 2000s once the weaknesses in the standard model had been well documented.

The center piece of these innovations was saturated patrol and hotspot policing. Introducing this intervention in the city makes sense as crime has a tendency to concentrate in localities with high commercial density and mobile criminals. In this context it makes sense to concentrate patrolling resources on localities that match this characteristic in order to prevent crime. The criminology literature suggests that the “effectiveness of the hot-spot policing approach has strong empirical support” (Weisburd and Eck 2004). Saturated patrolling and hot-spot policing in the city should target local areas with high commercial density but carefully document the pathways of displacement to assess its extent and get a sense of criminal response to a change in patrolling strategy. It is important to diagnose the effect of saturated patrolling on displacement to assess whether saturated patrolling is actually reducing crime or merely displacing it to other areas of the city.⁵⁶

The main objective of this approach is prevention and by nature it must be forward-looking, analytical and smart and it should have the capacity to respond swiftly to alter the cost and benefit for criminals who are mobile. This intervention should leverage the impressive public investment made by the Government of Punjab in PPIC3 Lahore, which is a global standard technological capability that integrates calls for service, real time surveillance using CCTVs and mobile cameras and rapid response units tied to a dispatch center. This has enhanced Lahore Police’s capacity for smart preventive patrolling and policing. However, unleashing the true potential of PPIC3 will require a number of complementary reforms in the absence of which it will simply be reduced to act as a supplier of information to an unreformed institutional system that is struggling to cope with the demands of policing in a rapidly evolving urban context.

In our view, the way forward in institutionalizing the capacity for smart preventive patrol and unleashing the potential for IC3 should involve decisions about the following key issues:

- **Assigning a gatekeeping role for preventive patrol.** Currently the “gatekeeper” of routing calls for service is the PPIC3 but the gatekeeper of assigning police level resources is the station clerk⁵⁷ and the station house officer (SHO) at the police station. The Lahore Police’s dolphin squad gives it some capacity for rapid response to calls for service but many calls are directed to the police station for further action. The gatekeeping role is inevitably tied to the way the FIR registration mechanism works. This is because the police will only commit resources in the case of cognizable crimes once an FIR has been registered. As we have shown this is likely to inhibit rapid response given the time delays and negotiation inherent in the process. One solution to this problem is to ensure automatic registration of the FIR at the PPIC3 level in cases of crime against property where no one is nominated as an alleged culprit. This solution will also address conventional concerns that automatic registration will lower the cost of frivolous cases and lead to an abuse of process.

⁵⁶ The effect of saturated patrolling on crime reduction and displacement is an important area of diagnostics in criminology. On this issue see Braga (2012a), Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2004), Hesseling (1994), Cornish and Clark (1987) and Repetto (1976).

⁵⁷ *Moharrar* in local parlance.

- **Formulating and institutionalizing a policy of “graded response”.** The policy should provide a framework for assigning calls to emergency response (which must be attended immediately), incidents where a delayed response in person is appropriate and incidents that only require a response by phone. This policy also needs to specify the conditions under which IC3 can register a case automatically. The policy must specify: (i) the criteria for guiding decisions about graded response, (ii) the mechanisms for supervising and monitoring implementation of guidelines and (iii) training programs for control staff room.
- **Institutionalizing an advisory helpline for victims.** There is also a need to institutionalize a proactive advisory helpline that helps victims mediate the criminal justice process, gives advice about the most appropriate course of action available to them and connects them to available legal resources where necessary.
- **Creating a rapid responsive service that integrates adequate patrolling resources and into the IC3 system.**
- **Developing codified practices that:** (i) set clear objectives for patrol officers and for monitoring their achievement, (ii) encourage problem-solving approaches at the local level by undertaking geographic targeting (targeting criminogenic hotspots) and (iii) improve tasking. Setting clear objectives will require defining objectives that are tightly defined, are set in the context of an area’s crime and incident patterns, specify the location and time when problems occur, define the scale of the problem, specify what impact the targeted action is intended to have and are monitored regularly and made part of the performance system of patrol officers.
- **Building capacity for proactive patrolling by encouraging a problem-solving approach and enabling geographic policing at the neighborhood level.** The key is to build the capacity for smart analysis that can identify and predict criminogenic areas for police deployment to stay ahead of criminals. It will also involve creating a command-driven deployment protocol informed by evidence and analysis rather than solely the gut-feel of patrol officers. Institutionalizing problem-solving approaches will require building the capacity to analyze the large calls for service data to identify patterns of crime rather than seeing them as isolated incidents. It will also involve neighborhood crime-control strategies carried out by dedicated prevention teams. An important difference with the standard model is that in the proposed model officers would go further than responding on a case-to-case basis; they will identify recurring problems, find solutions to problems that generate repeat incidents and feed this information to dedicated patrolling teams assigned to deal with crime problems in hotspot areas.

Some of these measures have already been introduced by PITB and the Punjab Police.⁵⁸ What is required is their effective institutionalization and implementation at scale. However, it is important to recognize that the effects of these measures will be attenuated in the absence of reforms of the registration process and the incentive system at police stations; and the lack of integration of the PPIC3 with a reformed institutional structure of field policing.

Community policing in criminogenic localities

Given the size of the city it will be difficult for the police to undertake smart and targeted prevention without working closely with the communities that inhabit criminogenic localities. The second intervention that needs to be adopted is community policing in criminogenic localities. There is a strong case of greater community

⁵⁸ MIT Technology Review Pakistan (2017) reviews the recently introduced interventions.

involvement in the definition of crime in these areas; in providing information and intelligence on offenders as well as areas and times being targeted by them; and in police activities to prevent and control crime. There could also be incentives for coordinated investment by the community and the government in technology for surveillance, such as CCTVs, and information provision systems. The key would be to tie the outputs of surveillance and information to a community-informed response system that is targeted to criminogenic areas. This could include community apps that crowd source information and are tied to rapid response systems in criminogenic areas. The government can set up a matching grant system to incentivize coordinated responses between the police and the community.

5.2. Measures to Build Trust in and Legitimacy of the Police

We have pointed out that institutionalizing a citizen-responsive process of FIR registration will require structural reforms of the police station as an institution. This is because under the current system the registration and investigation processes are embedded in police stations. While Pakistan has experimented with a host of reforms in policing since 2002⁵⁹, most efforts have focused on tiers that are external to the police station and have been grafted onto the colonial framework of policing at this level. The evidence presented in this chapter suggests that an unreformed police station is imposing excessive costs on complainants and may also be an important factor underpinning weak deterrence.

The feedback from our respondents highlights the distortions occurring at the police station level as a result of poor incentives to register crime⁶⁰ and process cases efficiently as well as the complexity and ad-hoc nature of processes. Feedback from the police highlights the distortions that are resulting from the lack of availability of adequate budgets for investigation⁶¹ and because of human capital challenges. A comprehensive reform of the police station as an institution will require enhanced fiscal support, investment in building human capital, restructuring the performance incentives of station officers and institutionalizing standardized processes that are transparent, embed citizen feedback and are tied to the performance-based accountability of officers. This large-scale reform is unlikely to happen in the short run because of political economy challenges and because it will require further diagnostic work – on adequacy of budgets, distortions in performance incentives and the nature of human capital challenges – to build a consensus on how best to address these challenges.

In addition, there is a need to define transparent process standards that relate to the processing of cases against which a citizen can hold the officers accountable. To have traction the citizen feedback process needs to be embedded in a reformed process and the adherence to standards must be made part of the performance assessment framework of officers.

⁵⁹ The Police Order 2002 introduced the most comprehensive changes to the structure of policing. These included the introduction of Public Safety Commissions to insulate police from political pressures, police complaints authorities to ensure external police accountability, security of tenure for police officers, introduction of functional specialization in the police through separation of investigation and the watch & ward system, change in the process of transfer of investigations to insulate against political interference in investigations, legal provisions for metropolitan policing through introduction of a different system of policing in the metropolitan areas and giving police leadership autonomy in internal decision making.


⁶⁰ The performance of SHOs is measured in terms of the number of cases registered with a lower number being considered better. This makes it obviously undesirable for SHOs to register all cases happening in the jurisdiction of a police station.

⁶¹ Report presented by Regional Police Office Sheikhupura to the Inspector General of Police Punjab.

5.3. What Does the Public Want?

How would our proposed set of interventions sit with the public? The IDEAS Lahore CVS asked respondents to suggest up to two crime-reducing measures, from a list, which they feel would be most effective in reducing neighborhood crime. The list included: saturated patrolling (concentrating patrolling resources in crime hot spots), community policing, creating pickets/checkposts in criminogenic areas, improving crime investigation, installing CCTV cameras and installing better street lighting. Figure 5.1 presents the results. It shows that there is high demand for saturated patrolling followed by improvements in investigation and this is followed by the introduction of community policing. These interventions match our proposed set of interventions. There is clearly high demand for preventive patrolling and community policing among the public.

Figure 5.1: Citizen Views on the Most Effective Ways to Control Local Crime




Source: IDEAS Lahore Crime Victimization Survey, 2016

Note: Respondents were asked to choose two from the following crime-reducing measures which they felt would be most effective in reducing crime in their area: saturated patrolling (concentrating patrolling resources in crime hot spots), community consultation (police consults community and then employs crime-reducing measures), creating pickets/checkpoints in crime-infested areas, improved crime investigation, installing CCTV cameras, better street lighting.

In fact, we find that there is a much higher demand for saturated patrolling and community policing in mixed and commercial localities that suffer from higher victimization rates (Figure 5.2). Interestingly, fewer

respondents from mixed and commercial localities consider investments in CCTVs and in investigation among the top two effective ways compared to respondents in residential localities. This suggests that our proposed interventions will resonate well with the public in the more criminogenic areas and would be regarded a success for the police and government.

Figure 5.2: Citizen Views on Most Effective Ways to Control Local Crime by Locality Type




Source: IDEAS Lahore Crime Victimization Survey, 2016.

Note: Respondents were asked to choose two from the following crime-reducing measures that they felt would be most effective in reducing crime in their area: saturated patrolling (concentrating patrolling resources in crime hot spots), community consultation (police consults community and then employs crime-reducing measures), creating pickets/checkpoints in crime-infested areas, improved crime investigation, installing CCTV cameras, better street lighting.

The IDEAS Lahore CVS also asked respondents to name the top two things they would like to change about how the police operates from a list that includes: improve their attitude towards the public, improve/simplify the crime registration process, reduce police corruption, improve the police's investigation capacity, improve the police's patrolling capacity, improve the police's media image, increase the number of policemen, insulate the police from political pressure, give them better technology, improve the police's working conditions, give them better salary and improve response time. It is interesting to note that the top three measures include police's attitude towards the public, insulation from political pressure and police corruption. Community policing, if designed well, provides an opportunity to alter the police's reputation about a force with poor attitude. Addressing police corruption clearly has to be an important goal for strengthening the legitimacy of the police with the citizenry and building a relationship of trust. Finally, insulating the police from political pressure is important if only to remove the perception of bias that the police force are biased towards the

connected and wealthy. Insulating the police from political pressure is also important because it would insulate democratic parties from the accusation of elite political capture.

Figure 5.3: How Citizens Would Change the Police



Source: IDEAS Lahore Crime Victimization Survey, 2016.

Note: Respondents were asked to choose two from the following list: improve their attitude towards the public, improve/simplify the crime registration process, reduce police corruption, improve police's investigation capacity, improve police's patrolling capacity, improve the police's media image, increase the number of policemen, insulate the police from political pressure, give them better technology, improve police's working conditions, give them better salary and improve response time.

5.4. Areas of Future Research

There are three important areas of future research. The first is to analyze the impact of innovative place-based prevention strategies. It is important for the police to introduce these strategies and estimate their impact on crime reduction and police legitimacy and trust. It is important to analyze whether place-based prevention results in sustained reduction in crime or simply displaces it to other areas.

The second area is to experiment with and assess the impact of different models of community policing. In particular, does coordinating crime prevention efforts between the police and communities in commercial areas result in crime reduction and help build police legitimacy and trust? It is important to learn what types

of inputs (e.g. provision of information and intelligence, investment in CCTVs and guards) from the community have a bigger effect on crime reduction.

The third area is to analyze what types of performance incentives work best in increasing police effectiveness and reducing the burden of unofficial payments. An important question is whether these outcomes could be improved by restructuring incentives alone or whether this will need to be complemented by enhanced resources.

Bibliography

- Ali, R. (2013) "Estimating Urbanization," *The Urban Gazette Reprint Series*, Urban Unit, Government of Punjab.
- Cheema, A.; Hameed, Z. and Naseer, M. F. (2017) "Safeguarding Pakistanis: Punjab's Crime Problem, its Pathology and Priority for Action," Institute of Development and Economic Alternatives Working Paper No: 01-17.
- Office for National Statistics (2016) "Crime in England and Wales: Bulletin Tables", UK
- Office for National Statistics, (2016) "Crime in England and Wales: Police Force Area Tables", UK
- Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, (2015) "Crime Victimization and Safety Perception: A Public Survey of Delhi and Mumbai"
- Bureau of Justice Statistics, (2016) "NCVS Crime Victimization Tool", (<http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=nvat>)
- Bailey, D. H. (Ed.). (1998). *What Works in Policing*. Oxford University Press, USA.
- Bradford, B. (2014) "Policing and Social Identity: Procedural Justice, Inclusion and Cooperation Between Police and Public". *Policing and Society*, 24(1): 22–43.
- Bradford, B.; Huq A.; Jackson, J. and Roberts, B. (2014) "What Price Fairness When Security is at Stake? Police Legitimacy in South Africa", *Regulation and Governance*, 8(2): 246–268.
- Braga A.A., Papachristos, A.V. and Hureau, D. M (2012 a) "The Effects of Hot Spots Policing on Crime: An Updated Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis", *Justice Quarterly*, 31(4): 633-663.
- Braga, A. A., Fyln, E., Kelling, G. and Cole, C. (2012 b) *Moving the Work of Criminal Investigators towards Crime Control*, National Institute of Justice: United States.
- Brantingham, P.L. and Brantingham, P.J. (1984) *Patterns in Crime*, Macmillan New York, NY
- Cornish, D. and Clarke, R.V. (1987) "Understanding Crime Displacement: An Application of Rational Choice Theory," *Criminology* 25: 933-947
- Eck, J. E. (1983) *Solving crime: A Study of the Investigation of Burglary and Robbery*, National Institute of Justice: United States.
- Glaeser, E. L., and Sacerdote. B. (1999) "Why Is There More Crime in Cities?" *Journal of Political Economy*, 107(6), pp. 225-258.
- Glaeser, E. and Sims, H. (2015) "Contagion, Crime, and Congestion: Overcoming the Downsides of Density", International Growth Centre, Growth Brief.
- Greenwood, P. W. and Petersilia, J.R (1975) "The Criminal Investigation Process — Volume I: Summary and Policy Implications," Rand Corporation: Santa Monica, CA.

- Greenwood, P. W., Chaiken, J. and Petersilia, J.R (1977) *The Investigation Process*, Rowman and Littlefield.
- Haque, N. U. (2014) "Achieving Progress, Growth, and Development through Urban Renewal," Wilson Center Policy Brief Series, Washington D.C.
- Hesseling, R.B.P. (1984) "Displacement: A Review of the Empirical Literature," in Clarke, R.V. (eds.) *Crime Prevention Studies*, 3, Lynne Rienner.
- Hough, M. (2013) "Procedural Justice and Professional Policing in Times of Austerity", *Criminology and Criminal Justice* 13(2): 181–197.
- Jackson, J., Bradford, B., Stanko, B. and Hohl, K. (2012) *Just Authority? Trust in the Police in England and Wales*, Routledge: UK.
- Jackson, J., Asif, M., Bradford, B. and Zakar, M. Z. (2014). "Corruption and Police Legitimacy in Lahore, Pakistan", *British Journal of Criminology*, 54. 6: 1067-1088
- Meares, T. L. and Tyler, T.R. (2014) "Justice Sotomayor and the Jurisprudence of Procedural Justice," *The Yale Law Journal Forum*, Yale.
- McCluskey, J.D. (2003) *Police Requests for Compliance: Coercive and Procedurally Just Tactics*’. LFB, New York.
- MIT Technology Review Pakistan (2017) *Transforming Policing Through Technology*, ITU, Punjab.
- Putnam, R. (1993) *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*, Princeton University Press.
- Reiss, A. Jr. (1971) *The Police and the Public*, Yale University Press: New Haven, CT.
- Reiss, A. Jr., and Bordua, D. J. (1967) "Environment and Organization: A Perspective on the Police." in Bordua, D. J. (eds.) *The Police: Six Sociological Essays*, John Wiley: New York.
- Repetto, T. A. (1976) "Crime prevention and the Displacement Phenomenon". *Crime & Delinquency* , 22(2): 166-77.
- Sampson, R. J. (2013) "The Place of Context: A Theory and Strategy for Criminology's Hard Problems," *Criminology* 51(1): 1-31
- Sampson, R. J. and Stephen W. R. (1999) "Systematic social observation of public spaces: A new look at disorder in urban neighborhoods". *American Journal of Sociology* 105. 3: 603-651.
- Schulhofer, S.; Tyler, T.R. and Huq, A. Z. (2011) "American Policing at a Crossroads: Unsustainable Policies and the Procedural Justice Alternative," *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, 101.2: 335-375.
- Siddique, O. *Caseflow Management in Courts in Punjab: Frameworks, Practices and Reform Measures*, Punjab Access to Justice Project, EU-GDSI Limited.
- Siddique, O. (2013) *Pakistan's Experience with Formal Law: An Alien Justice*, Cambridge University Press.
- Tella, R. and Schargrodsky, E. (2004) "Do Police Reduce Crime? Estimates Using the Allocation of Police Forces after a Terrorist Attack," *American Economic Review*, 94(1): 115-133

- Tyler, T. R. (2006a) "Why People Obey the Law". Princeton University Press: United States.
- Tyler, T. R. (2006b) "Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation," *Annual Review of Psychology*, 57: 375–400.
- Tyler, T. R. (2009) "Procedural Justice, Identity and Deference to the Law: What Shapes Rule Following in a Period of Transition?" *Australian Journal of Psychology*, 61(1): 32-39.
- Tyler, T. R. (2011a) "Trust and Legitimacy: Policing in the US and Europe", *European Journal of Criminology*, 8(4): 254–266.
- Tyler, T. R. (2011b) *Why People Cooperate: The Role of Social Motivations*, Princeton University Press: United States.
- Tyler, T. R. and Jackson, J.P. (2014) "Popular Legitimacy and the Exercise of Legal Authority: Motivating Compliance, Cooperation and Engagement," *Psychology, Public Policy and Law*, 20(1): 78–95.
- Weisburd, D., Groff, E. and Yang, S. (2012) *The Criminology of Place*, Oxford University Press: UK.
- Weisburd, D., Lum, C. and Yang, S. (2004) *Criminal Careers of Places: A Longitudinal Study*, National Institute of Justice: University of Maryland.
- Weisburd, David, and Eck, J.E. (2004) "What Can Police do to Reduce Crime, Disorder, and Fear?" *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 593.1: 42-65.
- Wilson, J. Q. and Herrnstein, R. (1980) *Crime and Human Nature*, Simon and Schuster.
- Wirth, L. (1938) "Urban as a Way of Life," *American Journal of Sociology*, XLIV, pp. 1-24.

Appendix 1: Sampling Methodology

At the heart of the report is hard evidence collected through a primary crime and victimization survey that was designed and managed by the Institute of Development and Economic Alternatives (IDEAS). While the survey drew on international standard crime and victimization surveys and surveys of citizen perceptions of the police, it modified questions to Lahore's context on the basis of extensive field testing. This appendix describes the sampling methodology used by the study.⁶²

A.1.1. Sampling: Methodology and the Primary Sampling Unit

An important aim of the study was to be representative of localities that face a different incidence of crime. Therefore, we adopted a two-stage sampling strategy where the first-stage drew a random stratified sample of localities by intensity of crime and the second-stage drew a random sample of respondents in each sample locality.

The first challenge that we faced with regard to sampling is the lack of a standardized definition of neighborhoods or localities in Pakistani cities. The boundaries used to define the lowest unit of sampling in urban areas by the Census office are not available to researchers. The lowest unit of government, the union council, is too large and does not correspond to the organic boundaries of neighborhoods. Furthermore, the boundaries of union councils are also unavailable to researchers. In the absence of a standardized definition of neighborhoods or localities we derived our primary sampling unit by superimposing an arbitrary geographic grid on the map of the Lahore. The grid was calibrated to divide the city into squares, each with an area of 2500 square meters. The decision about the area was reached after extensive consultation with the Punjab police who felt that this was an efficient size for patrolling purposes. Therefore, the primary sampling units used in this study are grid squares. For the purpose of this report we call these squares "localities."

A.1.2. Sampling: First-Stage

The first-stage drew a stratified random sample of grid squares by absolute crime intensity at the grid level. We created five strata, or grid categories: Highest Crime; High Crime; Medium Crime; Low Crime and Zero Crime. The grid categories were created on the basis of incident-level, geo-located registered crime data for 2013-14 that was made available by the Punjab Information Technology Board (PITB) and the Punjab Police. The crime data used for categorizing grids is based on registered property and person crime data. We did not use other categories of registered crime as they are prone to misreporting. The definitions of grid categories used for first-stage sampling are as follows:

- Highest crime grids: Top 10% of the grids in terms of crime counts
- High crime grids: 66th to 90th percentile of grids in terms of crime counts
- Medium crime grids: 33rd to 66th percentile of grids in terms of crime counts
- Low crime grids: Below the 33rd percentile in terms of crime counts but greater than zero

⁶² The IDEAS Crime and Victimization Survey drew on the following surveys on crime victimization and citizen perceptions: National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS), Bureau of Justice Statistics, US; JPAL public opinion survey; JPAL Indian Crime Survey; British Crime Survey; Kansas City Patrol (citizen) Survey (1972); Jackson et al (2012); Jackson et al. (2014).

- Zero Crime grids: No recorded crime

The first-stage sample includes all the highest crime grids in our sample. In addition, we drew a random sample of grids from the remaining categories as follows:

- sample half of the high crime grids
- sample 21% of the medium crime grids
- sample 15% of the low crime grids
- sample 1.6% of the zero crime grids

The sample sizes were chosen to ensure reasonable standard errors on our estimates of population attitudes and victimization within each type of grid. In drawing the first-stage sample, we use probability proportional to size (PPS) sampling of grids by police station. We draw a sample of grids from each grid category in each police station, such that the sample reflects the distribution in the population of grids within that police station. For example if a police station with 50 grids has 10 high crime grids, this represents 20% of the grids in the population for this police station. We would then draw 20% of the grids for this particular police station from high crime grids. Our sample is drawn from every police station in Lahore except Cantonment as we were not given permission to survey there.

Table A.1 shows that this sampling procedure provides greater precision in the highest and high-crime grid areas. However, it also gives a sufficient sample to measure attitudes and experiences in the other grid categories.

Table A.1

Grid type	Number of Grids in Population	Number of Grids in Sample
Highest Crime	229 (4.98%)	229 (31.81%) 100%
High Crime	469 (10.20%)	232 (32.22%) 50%
Medium Crime	665 (14.46%)	139 (19.31%) 21%
Low Crime	488 (10.61%)	75 (10.42%) 15%
Zero Crime	2749 (59.76%)	45 (6.25%) 1.6%
TOTAL	4600 (100%)	720 (100%)

To gain representative estimates of key quantities across Lahore we weight the sample appropriately using inverse probability weighting. We generate population figures at the grid level using Asiapop data. Based on a validation exercise Asiapop appears to provide better estimates in lower population areas compared to other gridded population data. Sample weights were calculated as follows:

$$\text{Weight} = (1/\text{probability of selecting a grid}) * (\text{estimated population within each grid} / \text{respondents in each grid})$$

Table A.2

	Mean	25th Percentile	Median	75th Percentile	Std Dev	Min	Max
weight	1764.4	759.2	1192.3	1912.7	3174.2	88.6	43846.3

Table A.2 shows that most of the sampling weights lie less than one standard deviation of the mean of the sampling weight. Thus our estimates are unlikely to give undue weight to select observations.

A.1.2. Sampling: Second-Stage

The first-stage sampling methodology gives a total sample of 720 grids in Lahore (Table A.1). The second-stage randomly samples seven respondents in each sample grid, giving a total sample of 5040 respondents. We adopted the following methodology for second-stage sampling. In each grid we used GIS tools to identify seven random starting points. Of these, three points are target survey points. Based on pre-testing we included four replacement points to be used in the event that any of the original points is not a valid starting point. Surveyors reach these points with the help of major landmarks in the grid identified by the survey team. Each surveyor was provided maps of the target grid area and four adjacent grids. The maps were given to provide them an understanding of the exact location and boundaries of their assigned grids.

The points given to the surveyors are numbered 1-7. The surveyor uses point 1 to begin sample selection. At each point, a maximum of four respondents are surveyed, irrespective of whether they are residential or commercial, before moving to the next point. If a point is located in an area where no surveys can be conducted (e.g. because there is no population), the surveyor replaces this point with the first point on the replacement list and goes down the list if needed.

Respondents are identified by following the “left-hand rule” at each designated point. This means that when facing property number 1, the surveyor lists the properties to his left and numbers them in numeric order. The surveyor selects the respondents to be surveyed by going down this list. After each successful interview, the surveyor draws a sample by skipping two properties on the list. If a street ends the surveyor chooses a property that is on the left and adjacent to the previous property and continues selecting respondents from properties on the left. In case the left-hand rule cannot be applied because of a lack of properties or reaching the grid boundary, the surveyor uses a “right-hand rule” for sampling.

A.1.3. Robustness

To assess the veracity of the survey data Figure A.1 plots the correlation between survey victimization and the total number of registered crime within grids that were sample aggregated to the police station level. The line is the linear fit between these two variables. We observe a strong, positive correlation, though inferred survey victimization counts are substantially larger than those observed in the police’s registered crime data.

Figure A.1: Within-Sample Estimate of Survey Victimization and Crime Incidence

